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Antenuptial Contracts Governing Alimony or Property Rights Upon Di-
vorce: Osborne u. Osborne' - The traditional treatment of antenuptial con-
tracts governing alimony or property rights upon divorce has been to hold these
contracts void on public policy grounds. 2 Since 1970, however, courts in a
growing number of jurisdictions have abandoned this approach, holding in-
stead that such contracts are not void per se. 3 The current trend of decisions is
based on a recognition of a changed public policy toward divorce, 4 as well as on
an awareness that with the present high rate of divorce,' more people may want
to plan realistically for the possibility of divorce . 5 Nonetheless, even courts
which recognize that these contracts may be valid seem markedly reluctant to
enforce them.' Concern with the possibilities of overreaching, duress, and
change in circumstances between the date of the contract's execution and the
1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2216, 428 N.E.2d 810 (1981).
2 See, e.g., Norris v. Norris, 174 N.W.2d 368, 370 (Iowa 1970); Fincham v. Fincham,
160 Kan. 683, 688, 165 P.2d 209, 213 (1946); Mulford v. Mulford, 211 Neb. 747, 749, 320
N.W.2d 470, 471 (1982); Fricke v. Fricke, 257 Wis. 124, 126, 42 N.W.2d 500, 501 (1950).
3 Barnhill v. Barnhill, 386 So.2d 749, 751 (Ala. Civ. App, 1980); Newman v.
Newman _ Colo. _, 653 P.2d 728, 732 (1982); Parniawski v. Parniawski, 33
Conn. Supp. 44, 47-48, 359 A.2d 719, 720-22 (1976); Burtoff v. Burtoff, 418 A.2d 1085, 1089
(D.C. App. 1980); Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 385 (Fla. 1970), reu'd on other grounds, 257
So. 2d 530 (Ha. 1972); Scherer v. Scherer, 249 Ga. 635, 640, 292 S.E.2d 662, 666 (1982); Volid
v. Volid, 6 Ill. App. 3d 386, 391-92, 286 N.E.2d 42, 47 (1972); Matlock v. Matlock, 223 Kan.
679, 683, 576 P.2d 629, 633 (1978); Ferry v. Ferry, 586 S.W.2d 782, 786 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979);
Buettner v. Buettner, 89 Nev. 39, 45, 505 P.2d 600, 604 (1973); Freeman v. Freeman, 565 P.2d
365, 367 (Okla. 1977); Unander v. Unander, 265 Or. 102, 107, 506 P.2d 719, 721 (1973).
New York and Wisconsin permit these antenuptial contracts by statute. See N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAWS 236(13)(3) (Consol. 1981-1982); WIS. STAT. ANN. SS 767.255(11), 767.26(8)
(West 1981).
In addition, several jurisdictions recognize the validity of antenuptial contracts govern-
ing property rights upon divorce, but have not recently ruled on the validity of those governing
alimony rights. See Spector v. Spector, 23 Ariz. App. 131, 136, 531 P.2d 176, 181 (1975); Tom-
linson v. Tomlinson, 170 Ind. App. 331, 340, 352 N.E.2d 785, 791 (1976); Flora v. Flora, 166
Ind. App. 620, 629, 337 N.E.2d 846, 851 (1975); Hafner v. Hafner, 295 N.W.2d 567, 571-72
(Minn. 1980); In re Marriage of Cohn, 18 Wash. App. 502, 569 P.2d 79 (1977); Laird v. Laird,
597 P.2d 463 (Wyo. 1979). The proposed Uniform Marital Property Act of 1981 would also per-
mit prospective spouses to enter antenuptial contracts involving property rights upon divorce.
UNIFORM MARITAL PROPERTY ACT 5514, 16(a) (Discussion Draft 1981) [hereinafter referred
to as UMPA]. Some states accord statutory recognition to these contracts. See, e.g. , MINN. STAT.
ANN. 5 519.11 (West 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. 5 40-4-202 (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. 5 50.20(d)
(1981).
4 See, e.g., Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 384-85 (Fla. 1970), reo'd on other grounds,
257 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1972); Unander v. Unander, 265 Or. 102, 105-06, 506 P.2d 719, 720-21
(1973).
See, e.g., Newman v. Newman, _, Colo.
	
n.4, 653 P.2d 728, 732 n.4
(1982); Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 384 (Fla. 1970), reo'd on other grounds, 257 So. 2d 530
(Fla. 1972); Volid v. Volid, 6 Ill. App. 3d 386, 392, 286 N.E.2d 42, 47 (1972).
6 See, e.g., Newman v. Newman, - Colo. -, n.4, 653 P.2d 728, 732 n.4
(1982); In re Marriage of Dawley, 17 Cal. 3d 342, 352, 551 P.2d 323, 329, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3, 9
(1976); Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 384 (Fla. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 257 So.2d 530
(Fla. 1972).
7 See, e.g. , Scherer v. Scherer, 249 Ga. 635, 641, 292 S.E.2d 662, 666 (1982) (antenup-
tial contracts governing rights upon divorce "should not be given carte-blanche enforcement").
But see Newman v. Newman, _ Colo. _ 653 P.2d 728, 734 (1982), in which the Colorado
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date of its enforcement has led the courts to impose a variety of restrictions on
these antenuptial contracts. Thus, for the contract to be valid, each prospective
spouse may be required, before the contract's execution, to disclose to the other
his or her financial worth.° This requirement is usually predicated on the idea
that the parties to an antenuptial contract occupy a confidential relationship. 9
The courts may also explicitly require the spouse seeking to enforce the con-
tract to show that the party contesting the contract entered into it voluntarily."'
In addition, in some jurisdictions, courts may require that the contract not be
unconscionable." Other jurisdictions require the contractual provision for the
ex-spouse to be fair." Finally, in several jurisdictions, courts may modify these
contracts under the rules governing postnuptial separation agreements."
Absent an enforceable contract, equitable distribution statutes will govern
property rights upon divorce in most states." Such statutes may also govern
awards of alimony." These statutes vary in their scope. Some subject only
property acquired during the marriage to equitable distribution.' 6 Others sub-
Supreme Court observed that "those who enter such agreements in Colorado should do so
cautiously and with attention to their interests, for in the final analysis they may receive only that
for which they bargained." The effects of Newman in Colorado may, however, be less dramatic
than this language of the court suggests. Although the Newman court will not review property pro-
visions of an antenuptial contract for conscionability or fairness, it will review an alimony provi-
sion for conscionability. Id. at 653 P.2d at 737. Alimony and property provisions, however,
often serve the same function. Clark, Antenuptial Contracts, 50 U. COLO. L. REV, 141, 153 (1979)
thereinafter referred to as Clark]. Therefore, the majority opinion in Newman may well have
given with one hand and taken with the other, as one judge suggested. Id. at 653 P.2d at
736 (Rovira, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
IS See, e.g., Friedlander v. Friedlander, 80 Wash. 2d 293, 302, 494 P.2d 208, 213
(1972).
9 Id.
'° See, e.g., Barnhill v. Barnhill, 386 So. 2d 749, 751 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980). See also
Klarman, Marital Agreements in Contemplation of Divorce, 10 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 397, 403 (1977)
[hereinafter referred to as Klarman]. Klarman suggests that since the voluntariness requirement
also applies to ordinary contracts, the explicit statement of voluntariness as a requirement of an
antenuptial contract's validity indicates the courts' awareness that the confidential relationship
increases the possibility of coercion. Id.
" See, e.g., Ferry v. Ferry, 586 S.W.2d 782, 786 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
" See, e.g., Osborne v. Osborne, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2216, 2224, 428 N.E.2d 810,
816 (1981). When conscionability or fairness is required, the relevant time for determining either
generally remains an open question. Clark, supra note 7, at 151. See, e.g., Ferry v. Ferry, 586
S.W.2d 782, 787 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979). At least one jurisdiction, however, explicitly requires the
contract to be fair at the date when enforcement is sought. See Osborne v. Osborne, 1981 Mass.
Adv. Sh. 2216, 2224, 428 N.E.2d 810, 816 (1981).
" See, e.g., Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 385 (Fla. 1970), rey'd on other grounds, 257
So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1972); Unander v. Unander, 265 Or. 102, 107, 506 P.2d 719, 721-22 (1973).
14 See Foster & Freed, Divorce in the Fifty States: An Overview as of August 1, 1981, 7 FAM.
L. REP. 4049, 4056-57 (BNA) (1981) [hereinafter referred to as Foster & Freed]. Foster and
Freed list forty common law property states in which the courts have power to equitably
distribute property either in the form of property distribution or only as alimony. Id. According
to Foster and Freed, four of the eight community property states follow a similar rule of equitable
distribution. Id. at 4056.
" See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, 34 (West 1981).
16 See, e.g., N.Y Dom. REL. LAW S 236(B)(5) (Consol. 1981-1982). Statutes of this
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ject all property, including that acquired by gift or inheritance and that ac-
quired before marriage, to equitable distribution." Under either type of
statute, a court has discretion to effect what it deems to be a fair or equitable
distribution of the spouses' property." Given the broad discretionary power
granted to courts by these statutes, 19
 the results of the equitable distribution
process are unpredictable." Antenuptial contracts, then, are important to
those who desire to limit alimony rights or to control the distribution of their
property in the event of divorce.
In Osborne v. Osborne, 21
 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
followed the current trend of judicial decisions treating antenuptial contracts
governing alimony or property rights upon divorce as not per se void. 22 At
issue in Osborne was the validity of an antenuptial contract in which both
spouses had waived all rights to alimony or property division under the state's
equitable distribution statute." Several hours before their marriage in 1967,
Barbara Mallinckrodt and David Osborne executed an antenuptial
agreement. 24
 It provided that neither spouse by virtue of the marriage would
acquire any interest in property the other spouse owned before the marriage or
acquired thereafter. 25
 The agreement further provided that in the event of
type purport to exclude property acquired by gift or inheritance from distribution. See N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW 5 236(B)(1)(d)(1), (B)(5)(b) (Consol. 1981-1982). They do not necessarily do
so, however. M. Glendon, Property Rights upon Dissolution of Marriages and Informal Unions, Un-
published Speech Delivered at Cambridge University, England, July 31, 1981, at n.26 (to be
published in THE CAMBRIDGE LECTURES — 1981 (1982)) [hereinafter referred to as M. Glen-
don, Property Rights], Under the New York statute, for example, "I'he court in its discretion, also
may make a distributive award to supplement, facilitate or effectuate a distribution of marital
property." N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW 5 236(B)(5)(e) (Consol. 1981-1982).
" See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, 5 34 (West 1981). In the majority of
states, all property is subject to equitable distribution. See M. GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND
THE NEW PROPERTY 62 (1981) [hereinafter referred to as GLENDON].
" See GLENDON, supra note 17, at 62. Under a typical statute, a court's discretion is
guided by statutory criteria. See, e.g. , MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 208, 5 34 (West 1981). Set also
Foster & Freed, supra note 14, at 4054-55, 4058 (listing states that have statutory criteria).
12 GLENDON, supra note 17, at 63 states that "[t]he wide-ranging power recently given
to judges in most states to redistribute all the spouses' assets (including even premarital and in-
herited property) in a divorce case is the single most distinctive feature of modern American
divorce law."
2° GLENDON, supra note 17, at 63; Rheinstein, Division of Marital Property, 12 WILLA-
mErrE L.J. 413, 432-33 (1976).
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2216, 428 N.E.2d 810 (1981).
22 Id. at 2223-24, 428 N.E.2d at 816.
23 Id. at 2219-20, 428 N.E.2d at 813-14.
24 Id. at 2218-19, 428 N.E.2d at 813.
23 Id. at 2219, 428 N.E.2d at 813.
The relevant provisions of the contract stated that 'Barbara and David intend this
agreement to be in full discharge of all . . . statutory marital property rights under the statutes
or law of any state in which they are now or may hereafter be domiciled" and that "neither,
upon or subsequent to said marriage, shall acquire any interest, right or claim in or to the prop-
erty, real and personal, of whatever kind or wherever situated, which the other now owns, pos-
sesses or is entitled to, or which the other may own, possess or become entitled to here-
after. . . " Id.
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divorce, neither spouse would be entitled to "any alimony, support money,
. . . or to any other money by virtue thereof." 26 In addition, the agreement
recited that Barbara had sufficient property for her own support" and that
"David, by reason of his becoming a member of the medical profession, con-
templates that he will have adequate earning power for his own support." 28 An
accurate schedule disclosing Barbara's wealth and expectation of inheritance
was attached to the agreement. 29 David, who first saw the agreement when
Barbara's attorney presented it to him several hours before the wedding, 5° read
it before signing. 3 '
Approximately seven years after their marriage, both parties filed actions
for divorce." David sought to establish an ownership interest in certain real
property and, in addition, sought alimony and a division of property under the
Massachusetts equitable distribution statute." After submitting the alimony
and property claims to a master," the probate court adopted the master's find-
ing that the husband should receive neither alimony nor a division of
26 Id.
27 Id. Barbara was heiress to a family fortune of about $17,000,000. Id. at 2218, 428
N.E.2d at 813. In 1976 her income from this property, most of which was held in trust, was ap-
proximately $540,000. Id. at 2218-19, 428 N.E.2d at 813.
28 Id. at 2219, 428 N.E.2d at 813. David had no significant assets at that time. Id.
When the Supreme Judicial Court decided the case, David and Barbara were both practicing
physicians and earning "respectable salaries." Id. at 2220, 428 N.E.2d at 814. In 1977, David
was earning between $40,000-$50,000 a year and had a seven year employment contract which
included annual increases in salary. Brief of Appellee at 10-11, 32-33, Osborne v. Osborne, 1981
Mass. Adv. Sh. 2216, 428 N.E.2d 810 (1981).
29 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2216, 2219, 428 N.E.2d 810, 813 (1981).
38 Id. at 2226, 428 N.E.2d at 817.
31 Id. at 2219, 428 N.E.2d at 813.
82 Id. at 2217, 428 N.E.2d at 812.
33 Id. The equitable distribution statute, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, $ 34 (West
1981) provides:
Upon divorce or upon motion in an action brought at any time after a divorce, the
court may make a judgment for either of the parties to pay alimony to the other. In
addition to or in lieu of a judgment to pay alimony, the court may assign to either
husband or wife all or any part of the estate of the other. In determining the amount
of alimony, if any, to be paid, or in fixing the nature and value of the property, if
any, to be so assigned, the court, after hearing the witnesses, if any, of each party,
shall consider the length of the marriage, the conduct of the parties during the mar-
riage, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocation-
al skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the op-
portunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income. The court may
also consider the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation
or appreciation in value of their respective estates and the contribution of each of the
parties as a homemaker to the family unit.
Had the court found the antenuptial agreement invalid, all of the wife's property as well
as her expected inheritance would have been potentially subject to distribution.
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2216, 2217, 428 N.E.2d 810, 812 (1981). Upon the husband's
motion, the case was also submitted to a second master for findings on the parties' needs and
their contributions as homemakers. Id. at 2217, 428 N.E.2d at 812. The probate court struck this




property." Rather than ruling on the validity of the antenuptial contract as a
bar to the husband's claim, however, the court found that the husband was not
in need of alimony or an assignment of property. 36 The probate court also
found that three parcels of real property standing in the joint names of husband
and wife were jointly held."
Both parties appealed the probate court's decision and the Supreme
Judicial Court granted the wife's application for direct appellate review." The
wife claimed that the probate court erred in failing to give full effect to the ante-
nuptial contract and in striking a master's finding that she was sole owner of
the real estate held in joint title form." Thus, the Supreme Judicial Court was
faced with deciding whether antenuptial contracts governing alimony or prop-
erty rights upon divorce would be valid in Massachusetts, an issue on which
the court had not ruled previously." The contract, the court concluded, was
controlling on all claims of the husband. 4 t Thus, the court found that the pro-
bate court had erred in striking the master's finding that the wife was sole
owner of the real property held in joint title form. 42
 In addition, the court found
that the contract precluded the husband's claim to alimony and a division of
property under the equitable distributiOn statute.° In deciding to enforce the
contract, the Osborne court followed the trend of decisions in other jurisdictions,
and held that "an antenuptial contract settling the alimony or property rights
of the parties upon divorce is not per se against public policy and may be
specifically enforced. " 44
This holding was based on the Osborne court's recognition that a changed
public policy toward divorce allowed couples to divorce more freely.° The
legislature, the court observed, had removed significant obstacles to divorce by
as Id.
36 Id. at 2218, 428 N.E.2d at 813.
" Id. at 2217, 428 N.E.2d at 812. The first master had concluded that this property be-
longed solely to the wife. Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 2218, 428 N.E.2d at 813.
4° Id. at 2219-20, 428 N.E.2d at 813-14.
4 ' Id. at 2218, 428 N.E.2d at 813.
" Id.
43 Id.
4+ Id. at 2223-24, 428 N.E.2d at 816. The court left open the question of the validity of
antenuptial contracts purporting to limit the duty of either spouse to support the other during
marriage. Id. at 2224, 428 N.E.2d at 816. Thus it is open to the court to rule in a future case that
waivers of alimony covering the period between separation and divorce may not be enforced.
Courts in two jurisdictions which have held that antenuptial contracts governing alimony and
property rights upon divorce are not per se invalid have already done so. See Belcher v. Belcher,
271 So. 2d 7, 10 (Fla. 1972) (waiver will be considered by the court but is not controlling) and
Eule v. Eule, 24 Ill. App. 3d 83, 88, 320 N.E.2d 506, 510 (1974) (clause in antenuptial contract
forfeiting wife's right to temporary alimony if the marriage ended within seven years held void).
See also Holliday v. Holiday, 358 So. 2d 618, 620 & n.6 (La. 1978) (holding waiver of alimony
pendente lite in an antenuptial contract void as against public policy, but leaving open the issue
of the validity of waivers of permanent alimony).
49 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2216, 2223, 428 N.E.2d 810, 815 (1981).
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abolishing the doctrine of recrimination" and by adopting irretrievable break-
down as a ground for divorce." In the court's view, since the legislature had
removed significant obstacles to divorce, there was no reason not to allow pro-
spective spouses "the freedom to settle their rights in the event their marriage
should prove unsuccessful, and thus remove a potential obstacle to their
divorce. , 48
Having acknowledged the freedom of prospective spouses to contract, the
court immediately qualified this freedom." Without explaining its reasoning,
the court observed that it was not appropriate to leave the freedom to enter
such contracts unrestricted. 50 Thus, in dicta, 51 the court established "some
guidelines" for determining the extent to which these contracts could be en-
forced." The court first stated that the validity of the contract would be judged
by the fair disclosure rules delineated in Rosenberg u. Lipnick, 53 a 1979 Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court case concerning the validity of antenuptial
contracts governing rights upon death. In Rosenberg, the court established that
the parties to an antenuptial contract would be viewed as occupying a confiden-
tial relationship." Then, based on this confidential relationship, the Rosenberg
court imposed on each party the burden of disclosing to the other, prior to the
contract's execution, the amount, character, and value of his or her assets."
The Rosenberg court also stated that in determining the validity of an antenup-
tial contract, a court may consider the following factors: (1) whether the con-
tract contains a fair and reasonable provision as measured at the date of its ex-
ecution for the party contesting the contract," (2) whether the contract's execu-
tion was preceded by full disclosure or the party contesting the contract had, or
should have had, independent knowledge of the other party's worth, and (3)
46 Id. (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, 1 (1975)). Recrimination is a defense to a
divorce based on fault grounds. The doctrine "automatically preclud[es] a divorce of parties who
have each been guilty of marital misconduct of equal stature toward the other. . . ." Mogged
v. Mogged, 55 Ill. 2d 221, 223, 302 N.E.2d 293, 294 (1973).
* 7 Id. (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, 5 1 (1975)). Divorce on the ground of irre-
trievable breakdown of the marriage is also referred to as no fault divorce. Massachusetts
General Laws chapter 208, 1, establishes two different procedures for obtaining a divorce on
the ground of irretrievable breakdown.
48 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2216, 2223, 428 N.E.2d 810, 815-16 (1981).
49 Id. at 2224, 428 N.E.2d at 816.
" Id.
" Id. The contract at issue in Osborne was entered before the Supreme Judicial Court
established that it would apply fair disclosure rules to antenuptial contracts. These rules apply
only to contracts entered after March 30, 1979. Rosenberg v. Lipnick, 377 Mass. 666, 671, 389
N.E.2d 385, 388 (1979).
52 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2216, 2224, 428 N.E.2d 810, 816 (1981).
33 Id. at 2224, 428 N.E.2d at 816, citing Rosenberg v. Lipnick, 377 Mass. 666, 389
N.E.2d 385 (1979).
54 377 Mass. 666, 671, 389 N.E.2d 385, 388 (1979).
55 Id. at 671, 389 N.E.2d at 388.
56 Id. at 672, 389 N.E.2d at 388. The reasonableness of the contract's monetary provi-
sion is to be judged in light of the parties' respective worth, ages, intelligence, literacy, business




whether the contract contains a waiver by the party contesting the contract's
validity . 57
In addition to establishing that Rosenberg's fair disclosure rules would
determine the validity of antenuptial contracts governing rights upon divorce,
the Osborne court set forth other guidelines for determini.ng the extent to which
these contracts should be enforced. First, the court observed that these con-
tracts would be binding on courts to the same extent as postnuptial separation
agreements since, in the court's view, the same public policies applied to both
kinds of agreements." Thus, the court established that these antenuptial con-
tracts must be fair and reasonable at the time of the judgment nisi. 59 Second,
the court established that courts may modify these contracts in certain situa-
tions." In conjunction with this guideline, the court provided two examples of
situations calling for modification. One concerned a spouse who would be a
public charge if the contract were enforced without modification; the other,
custody provisions not in a child's best interests. 5 ' Last, the court observed that
some contracts might "so unreasonably encourage divorce as to be unenforce-
able on grounds of public policy." 62
After establishing these guidelines for determining the enforceability of
antenuptial contracts governing rights upon divorce, the court addressed
whether an antenuptial contract may govern rights in property acquired after
marriage." The court rejected the husband's claim that even if the antenuptial
" Id. at 672, 389 N.E.2d at 388.
58 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2216, 2224, 428 N.E.2d 810, 816 (1981).
39 Id. at 2224, 428 N.E.2d at 816. A judgment nisi does not dissolve the marriage. A
judgment nisi may become absolute six months after its entry. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 208,
$ 21 (West 1981).
6° 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2216, 2224, 428 N.E.2d 810, 816 (1981).
b ' Id. at 2224, 428 N.E.2d at 816.
62 Id. at 2225, 428 N.E.2d at 816. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS % 190
(1981), cited in Osborne, contains one example of such a contract. Illustration 5 sets forth an ante-
nuptial contract providing that the husband will settle one million dollars on his prospective wife
in the event of divorce. The RESTATEMENT notes that a court may decide that the large settle-
ment unreasonably encourages divorce and may refuse to enforce the contract on public policy
grounds.
Clark, however, has observed that in states which have adopted irretrievable
breakdown as a ground for divorce, "[t]he antenuptial agreement . . can hardly be more con-
ducive to divorce than the divorce grounds themselves." Clark, supra note 7, at 149. Most states,
including Massachusetts, recognize irretrievable breakdown as a ground for divorce. MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 208, 5 1 (West 1975); Foster & Freed, supra note 14, at 4051. It seems like-
ly, then, that the Osborne court's retention of power to refuse to enforce contracts unreasonably
encouraging divorce will have little effect on the enforcement of antenuptial contracts. Therefore,
this restriction on the enforcement of antenuptial contracts will not be discussed in this casenote.
63
 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2216, 2225, 428 N.E.2d 810, 816-17 (1981).
The court also resolved two other claims presented by the husband. First, it rejected his
claim that the contract was invalid because signed under duress. The court noted that although
the husband first saw the contract a few hours before the wedding, he and his intended wife had
discussed the agreement previously. Id. at 2226, 428 N.E.2d at 817. Second, the court rejected
the husband's claim of a half interest in three parcels of real estate held in joint title form, finding
that the presumption of a gift had been rebutted. Id. at 2226-30, 428 N.E.2d at 817-19.
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contract were valid, the state statute recognizing antenuptial contracts preclud-
ed application of the contract to property acquired during the marriage." The
statute, Massachusetts General Laws chapter 209, section 25, states in
substance that before marriage prospective spouses may enter a written con-
tract providing that property possessed by either spouse "at the time of the
marriage" will remain or become the property of the husband or wife." The
husband claimed that the statutory language "at the time of the marriage"
precluded application of the contract to property acquired after the marriage. 66
In rejecting this claim, the court noted that the statute, which was enacted in
1845, was intended to remove the common law disability of prospective spouses
to enter an enforceable contract to be performed during marriage." In the
court's view, the statute did "not affect the rights of the parties to determine
their rights upon termination of the marriage." 68 Thus, in Osborne the court
established that antenuptial contracts governing rights upon divorce could
determine the parties' rights in property acquired during the marriage."
In summary, Osborne established that antenuptial contracts governing
alimony or property rights upon divorce were not per se void and could govern
property acquired during marriage, but that to be enforceable, the contract
must not only meet Rosenberg's fair disclosure rules but also must be fair and
reasonable at the time of the judgment nisi. In addition, the Osborne court
established that such contracts may be subject to modification and that some
contracts might so unreasonably encourage divorce as to be unenforceable on
public policy grounds.
Osborne's significance is twofold. First, Osborne established that it is now
possible for prospective spouses in Massachusetts to contract out of the
equitable distribution statute which otherwise would govern awards of alimony
and distribution of property upon divorce. Second, and more importantly, the
possibility of contracting out of the equitable distribution statute is largely
undercut by restrictions the court imposed on the parties' freedom to enter a
binding and enforceable antenuptial contract. Three of these restrictions
render the enforcement of any antenuptial contract uncertain." The first
64 Id. at 2225, 428 N.E.2d at 817.
65 The statute provides in pertinent part that
At any time before marriage, the parties may make a written contract pro-
viding that, after the marriage is solemnized, the whole or any designated part of the
real or personal property or any right of action, of which either party may be seized
or possessed at the time of the marriage, shall remain or become the property of the
husband or wife, according to the terms of the contract.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 209, 5 25 (West 1958) (enacted in 1845 as ch. 208, S 1).
66 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2216, 2225, 428 N.E.2d 810, 816 (1981).
°' Id.
66 Id.
69 Id. at 2225, 428 N.E.2d at 817.
" See Gamble, The Antenuptial Contract, 26 U. MiAmt L. REV. 692, 693, 729 (1972)
[hereinafter referred to as Gamble]. See also Note, Antenuptial Contracts Determining Property Rights
Upon Death or Divorce, 47 U.M. KANSAS CITY L. REV. 31, 32 (1978) [hereinafter referred to as
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restriction, that the contract be valid under Rosenberg's fair disclosure rules,"
and the second restriction, that the contract be fair and reasonable at the time
of its enforcement," center on the fairness of the contractual provision for the
party contesting the contract. Both restrictions, in effect, require the parties to
foresee what a court will view as fair." The second restriction, that the contract
must be fair and reasonable at the time of the judgment nisi, exacerbates the
fairness restriction's inherent uncertainty by requiring parties to determine
before marriage how long the marriage is likely to last and how much circum-
stances may change between the time of the contract's execution and its en-
forcement. In addition, since one of the primary purposes of these antenuptial
contracts is to limit alimony or property claims," few contracts are likely to
seem fair in the light of state laws." Thus, the absolute requirement that the
contract be fair and reasonable at the time of its enforcement may mean that
few such contracts will be enforceable. The third restriction, that the courts
may modify the contract in certain situations, including that in which a spouse
would be a public charge if the contract were enforced as written," also creates
uncertainty. The public charge restriction may be a lower standard for enforce-
ability than that requiring the contract to be fair and reasonable at the time of
its enforcement." Thus, Osborne leaves open the possibility that a contract
which has been found enforceable at the time of the judgment nisi may later be
modified by the courts to prevent one spouse from becoming a public charge.
By adopting inherently ambiguous guidelines, the Osborne court has im-
posed restrictions on antenuptial contracts which, at best, make contracting
out of the equitable distribution statute uncertain, and, at worst, may make
contracting out almost impossible. Yet it is questionable whether a statute
granting a court discretion to distribute all of a spouse's property in a manner it
views as fair can meet the needs and desires of those who use antenuptial con-
tracts." People who enter these contracts usually have been married at least
Note, Antenuptial Contracts] suggesting that the judicial attitude toward antenuptial contracts "is
at best confused and unpredictable, and at worst frankly hostile."
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2216, 2224, 428 N.E.2d 810, 816 (1981).
22 Id.
" See Klartnan, supra note 10, at 403 stating that "[t]his amorphous [fairness] standard
handicaps individuals in their future planning because it is virtually impossible to predetermine
what a court may find to be a fair provision."
" See Gamble, supra note 70, at 724-25 (discussing antenuptial contracts governing
rights upon death). See also Estate of Friedman, 483 Pa. 614, 626, 398 A.2d 615, 621 (1978)
(noting also that "[a]lthough one purpose of antenuptial agreements is to foreclose litigation,
there have been many cases in which the validity of such contracts have been contested.").
" See Note, Antenuptial Contracts, supra note 70, at 41 (referring to antenuptial contracts
governing rights upon death).
1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2216, 2224, 428 N.E.2d 810, 816 (1981).
" See infra text accompanying notes 202-17.
78 See supra text accompanying notes 14-20. That the equitable distribution process ac-
cords with the desires of any divorcing couple is open to question. See GLENDON , supra note 17, at
65-66, suggesting that equitable distribution laws "ignore both intent and behavior." See also M.
Glendon, Property Rights, supra note 16, at 9 (observing that one drawback of equitable distribu-
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once previously." Some have children or ex-spouses from prior marriages to
support." Others may wish to leave their property to their children on death."
In addition, in at least some instances, but for the antenuptial contract there
would be no marriage. 82 The equitable distribution statute affords neither the
certainty nor the choice" in their financial affairs which people who enter these
contracts seek.
This casenote will suggest that in light of the high rate of divorce and the
unpredictable results of the equitable distribution process, there is a great need
for more certain rules to govern the enforcement of antenuptial contracts.
Those who enter these contracts do so because they want to plan realistically
for the possibility of divorce, to limit alimony or property rights, and to
foreclose litigation. The rules now applied to these contracts render their en-
forcement uncertain. It will be submitted that the rules governing these con-
tracts should be concerned with the fairness of the process of entering the con-
tract, not with the fairness of the contract itself. Part I of this casenote will
discuss the traditional void per se treatment of antenuptial contracts governing
rights upon divorce. Part II will offer a critique of the Osborne court's approach,
suggesting that the guidelines established by the court do little to meet the need
for predictability and choice in this area of the law, and thus the guidelines are
a potent source for defeating the expectations and needs of the parties to these
contracts. Finally, Part III will suggest adoption of a statute to govern enforce-
ment of these contracts. That statute will be concerned with the fairness of the
process of entering the agreement.
I. THE TRADITIONAL RULE VERSUS THE CURRENT TREND
Antenuptial contracts governing the rights of prospective spouses in one
another's estates upon death have long been favored by the law as promoting
marital harmony." Prior to 1970, however, similar contracts purporting to
tion is that "the system, because of inconsistency in results among apparently similar cases, is
widely perceived as unfair by litigants").
79 See Gamble, supra note 70, at 730-33. See also Clark, supra note 7, at 141(stating that
"[t]he typical antenuptial agreement is made by an older man and woman . . . who have previ-
ously been married . . .").
8° See, e.g. , Unander v. Unander, 265 Or. 102, 104, 506 P.2d 719, 720 (1973).
81 See Gamble, supra note 70, at 730-33.
82 See, e.g. , Barnhill v. Barnhill, 386 So. 2d 749, 751 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980); Burtoff v.
Burtoff, 418 A.2d 1085, 1087 (D.C. App. 1980); In re Marriage of Headington, 41 Or. App. 503,
505-06, 599 P.2d 1173, 1174 (1979).
83 See Newman v. Newman, 	 Colo.	 n 4, 653 P.2d 728, 732 n.4 (1982).
84 See, e.g. , Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17, 20 (Fla. 1962) (stating that
"such agreements are in harmony with public policy and often conducive to marital tranquility
. . . "); Rosenberg v. Lipnick, 377 Mass. 666, 673, 389 N.E.2d 385, 389 (1979) (stating that
"[t]he right to make antenuptial agreements settling property rights in advance of marriage is a
valuable personal right which courts should not regulate destructively."). Contra Note, Antenuptial
Contracts, supra note 70, at 32 (suggesting that although courts in theory favor antenuptial con-
tracts governing rights upon death, they are nonetheless frequently found unenforceable).
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govern the alimony and property rights of spouses upon divorce generally were
held void as contrary to public policy." Typically, the courts held that such
antenuptial contracts were contrary to public policy on one or more of three
grounds. 86
 Frequently, the courts viewed these contracts as promoting or facili-
tating separation or divorce by offering one party a financial incentive to end
the marriage." Some courts viewed these contracts as denigrating the status of
marriage." Other courts referred to the state's or the public's interest in
preventing one spouse from becoming a public charge as a reason to hold the
contract void as contrary to public policy. 89
The current trend, however, is to hold that antenuptial contracts govern-
ing the alimony or property rights of spouses upon separation or divorce are
not void per se. The landmark case is Posner v. Posner, 9° decided by the Florida
Supreme Court in 1970. The Posner court based its rejection of the traditional
void as against public policy rule on two principal grounds. First, the court
questioned the proposition that these antenuptial contracts facilitated or pro-
moted divorce." The court noted that antenuptial contracts governing the
spouses' rights in one another's estates upon death long had been viewed as
A discussion of antenuptial contracts governing rights of the parties on death is outside
the scope of this casenote. For a discussion of these contracts see Clark, supra note 7 and Note,
Antenuptial Contracts, supra note 70 (the articles discuss contracts governing rights upon both death
and divorce).
85 See, e.g. , Oliphant v. Oliphant, 177 Ark. 613, 625, 7 S.W.2d 783, 788 (1928). Ste gen-
erally 2 A. LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS S 90, at 90-33
(1979 & Supp. 1981) [hereinafter referred to as LINDEYI.
In one case prior to 1970, Hudson v. Hudson, 350 P.2d 596, 597 (Okla. 1960), the
Oklahoma Supreme Court did enforce an antenuptial contract waiving alimony and property
division. The Hudson court gave no reason for doing so other than that the contract was entered
"fairly, freely, understandingly and without fraud, that its provisions were reasonable and that
said contract was valid." Id. Hudson has recently been reaffirmed by the Oklahoma Supreme
Court in Freeman v. Freeman, 565 P.2d 365, 366-67 (Okla. 1977).
88 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2216, 2220, 428 N.E.2d 810, 814 (1981).
" See, e.g. , Fincham v. Fincham, 160 Kan. 683, 688, 165 P.2d 209, 213 (1946) (provi-
sion in an antenuptial contract limiting husband's liability to $2000 in event of separation found
to "invite and encourage a separation as a source of pecuniary profit to the husband"); Cohn v.
Cohn, 209 Md. 470, 475, 477, 121 A.2d 704, 706, 707 (1956) (court refused to enforce what it
termed a "buy out" provision of an antenuptial contract providing that the wife would receive
$5000 in lieu of alimony, finding that the provision induced separation); Matthews v. Matthews,
2 N.C. App. 143, 147, 162 S.E.2d 697, 699 (1968) (during the marriage, the husband executed a
contract providing that if he ever left his wife, all his property would be hers; the court found the
contract void on public policy grounds, stating that if the contract were enforceable "it would in-
duce the wife to goad the husband into separating from her in order that the agreement could be
put into effect . . . "); Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn. App. 594, 604, 385 S.W.2d 288, 293 (1964)
(if contract limiting husband's liability were enforceable, he could "through abuse and ill treat-
ment of his wife force her to bring an action for divorce and thereby buy a divorce for a sum far
less than he would otherwise have to pay").
88 See, e.g., Fricke v. Fricke, 257 Wis. 124, 126, 42 N.W.2d 500, 501 (1950).
89 See, e.g., Norris v. Norris, 174 N.W.2d 368, 370 (Iowa 1970) (antenuptial contract
relieving husband of duty to pay alimony against the public interest).
9° 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970), reu'd on other grounds, 257 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1972).
91
 Id. at 383-84.
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promoting marital harmony." Such contracts had been enforced in decedent's
estate cases despite the presence in the contract of provisions governing rights
upon divorce." The court observed that in some circumstances it was "not in-
conceivable" that these agreements also might be viewed as promoting
divorce." A spouse unhappy with the death provisions of a contract might, for
example, provoke a divorce to gain greater financial benefits through an
alimony award, since the divorce provisions of the contract would not be en-
forced." Yet this argument had not been used to invalidate antenuptial con-
tracts governing rights upon death." Thus, in the court's view, the argument
that antenuptial contracts governing rights upon divorce promoted divorce was
entitled to little weight."
A second and more important basis for the Posner court's decision was the
change in public policy towards divorce." The Posner court noted that although
marriage had once been viewed as "practically indissoluble," both the public
and the state were now more accepting of divorce. 99 This increased acceptance
of divorce was, in the court's view, manifested in the high rate of divorce and
the then new concept of no fault divorce.'°° In the court's view, this change in
public policy required a different rule for antenuptial contracts governing
alimony or property rights of spouses upon divorce.'°' Thus, the court deter-
mined that these contracts would no longer be treated as void per se.'° 2
For an antenuptial contract to be held valid, however, Posner established
that two conditions had to be met. First, the contract had to be valid under
rules the court had previously established for determining the validity of ante-
nuptial contracts governing the spouses' property rights upon death.'" These
rules established that an antenuptial contract would be valid if it could meet
one of three alternative requirements.'" Thus, the contract would be valid if it
contained a fair and reasonable provision for the wife.'" Absent a fair provi-





97 Id. at 383-84. See also Gamble, supra note 70, at 712 (suggesting the impossibility of
drafting an antenuptial contract which would not make it profitable in monetary terms for one of
the spouses to seek a divorce).
ge Id. at 383-85.
99 Id. at 384.
100 Id. Florida did not have no fault divorce when Posner was decided.
101 Id, at 385.
1 °2 Id.
Id., citing Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1962).
104 Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17, 20 (Fla. 1962). These rules no longer ap-
ply to antenuptial contracts governing rights upon death. The Florida legislature has eliminated
Del Vecchio's fair disclosure rules in the context of antenuptial contracts governing rights upon
death. Florida Statute S 732.702(2) provides that no disclosure is required for an antenuptial con-
tract governing rights upon death. FLA. STAT. ANN. S 732.702(2) (West 1976). See info note 191
for a discussion of this statute.




sion, the contract would be valid if, prior to the contract's execution, the hus-
band fully disclosed to the wife his worth.' 66 Absent a fair provision or
disclosure, the contract would be valid if, prior to its execution, the wife had
general knowledge of her prospective husband's worth.'" If an antenuptial
contract met one of these alternative requirements, Posner' s first condition for
its validity would be met. As a second condition for the contract's validity,
Posner required that the divorce be sought in good faith.'" The court noted that
if the contract met both of these conditions, it would be held valid as to condi-
tions existing at the time of its execution. ' 66 But the contract, the court estab-
lished, would be subject to modification if circumstances had changed since its
execution. 110
Since the landmark decision in Posner, only a few jurisdictions ruling on
the validity of antenuptial contracts governing alimony or property rights upon
divorce have continued to apply the void per se rule to all such contracts."
Another jurisdiction continues to apply the void per se rule to contracts govern-
ing alimony or support rights"' but has upheld contracts governing property
rights." 3 The current trend is to follow Posner in holding that antenuptial con-
tracts governing the alimony or property rights of the spouses upon divorce are
not void per se." 4
II. CRITIQUE OF OSBORNE
In Osborne, the court established that antenuptial contracts governing
alimony or property rights upon divorce were not per se invalid in Massachu-
setts and may be specifically enforced.'" But the restrictions the court imposed
on these contracts render contracting out of the unpredictable rule of equitable
distribution uncertain. By establishing that to be enforceable, a contract must
be valid under Rosenberg' s fair disclosure rules 16 and that, in addition, it must
be fair and reasonable at the time of the judgment nisi,'" Osborne suggests that
106 Id. at 20.
107 id.
108 Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 385 (Fla. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 257 So. 2d
530 (Fla. 1972).
109 Id.
11 ° Id. Modification of the antenuptial contract would be determined under the laws
governing postnuptial separation agreements. Id.
111 See, e.g. , In re Marriage of Winegard, 278 N.W.2d 505, 512 (Iowa 1979); Mulford v.
Mulford, 211 Neb. 747, 749, 320 N.W.2d 470, 471 (1982).
12 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Higgason, 10 Cal. 3d 476, 485, 516 P.2d 289, 295, 110
Cal. Rptr. 897, 903 (1973) (en banc), See also Connolly v. Connolly, 270 N.W.2d 44, 47 (S.D.
1978) (relying on public's interest in preventing one spouse from becoming a public charge).
"3 In re Marriage of Dawley, 17 Cal. 3d 342, 352, 551 P.2d 323, 329, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3,
9 (1976) (en bane) (disapproving dictum in Higgason that antenuptial contracts are invalid unless
the parties contemplated a marriage lasting until death); In re Marriage of Higgason, 10 Cal. 3d
476, 485, 516 P.2d 289, 295, 110 Cal. Rptr. 897, 903 (1973) (en bane).
114 See cases cited supra note 3.
" 5 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2216, 2223-24, 428 N.E.2d 810, 816 (1981).
116 Id. at 2224, 428 N.E.2d at 816.
117 Id.
482	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 24:469
the fairness of the contractual provision will be the primary factor determining
the contract's enforceability. Because the parties to these contracts cannot
foresee how circumstances may change" 9
 and what a court will view as fair, the
contract's enforceability will be uncertain until it is litigated upon divorce.
Finally, by establishing that the courts may modify a contract if its enforcement
would make one spouse a public charge," 9 the Osborne court seems to have
established that even if a contract is valid under Rosenberg's fair disclosure rules
and is found fair and reasonable at the time of the judgment nisi, it may be
modified later.
The Osborne court's decision can be challenged on four grounds. First, the
court's incorporation of Rosenberg's fair disclosure rules rests on the assumption
that a confidential relationship exists between the parties to an antenuptial con-
tract and that courts can determine the effects of that relationship. The
assumption is questionable.'" Second, the fair disclosure rules themselves are
inherently ambiguous and the results of their application difficult to predict. ' 2 '
Third, the requirement that the contract be fair and reasonable at the time of
its enforcement is also inherently ambiguous.'" Finally, the court's decision
leaves unclear the circumstances in which a contract may be modified and the
extent of that modification.'" Thus, the Osborne court's approach is not fully
responsive to both the needs and wishes of those who desire to settle their rights
with the certainty, and perhaps from their perspective, the fairness, which the
equitable distribution statute does not afford.
A. The Confidential Relationship
In Osborne, the court adopted Rosenberg's fair disclosure rules to judge the
validity of antenuptial contracts governing rights upon divorce. 124 Underlying
these disclosure rules is the confidential relationship said to exist between the
parties to an antenuptial contract.'" Because of this confidential relationship,
prospective spouses are seen as susceptible to overreaching by one another in
entering such contracts."' To prevent overreaching, courts have imposed fair
1 " See, e.g. , In re Marriage of Stokes, 43 Colo. App. 461, 608 P.2d 824, 828 (1979) (par-
ties enter into antenuptial agreements because they cannot foretell the future).
"9 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2216, 2224, 428 N.E.2d 810, 816 (1981).
120 See infra notes 124-58 and accompanying text.
' 21 See infra notes 161-92 and accompanying text.
In See infra notes 195-201 and accompanying text.
123 See infra notes 202-17 and accompanying text.
124 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2216, 2224, 428 N.E.2d 810, 816 (1981).
1 " See, e.g., In re Estate of Lopata, 	 Colo.	 641 P.2d 952, 956 (1982);
Rosenberg v. Lipnick, 377 Mass. 666, 671, 389 N.E.2d 385, 388 (1979); Friedlander v. Fried-
lander, 80 Wash. 2d 293, 302, 494 P.2d 208, 213-14 (1972). Cf. Unander v. Unander, 265 Or.
102, 107 n.2, 506 P.2d 719, 721 n.2 (1973) (duty of disclosure based on fiduciary duty of parties
entering an antenuptial contract).
126 Hartz v. Hartz, 248 Md. 47, 57, 234 A.2d 865, 871 (1967); Friedlander v. Fried-
lander, 80 Wash. 2d 293, 301, 494 P.2d 208, 213 (1972); Klarman, supra note 10, at 403.
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disclosure rules on parties seeking to enter enforceable antenuptial contracts.'"
These rules, in turn, are one source of uncertainty concerning the enforce-
ability of antenuptial contracts. 128 It is important, therefore, to determine
whether the theory of a confidential relationship offered to justify these rules is
sound today. 129
There are no Massachusetts cases shedding light on this question. Cases
from other jurisdictions do, however, offer some illumination. These cases
reveal that at the heart of the confidential relationship doctrine was the courts'
paternalistic belief that women entering these contracts could be easily over-
reached.'" Although early cases, like more recent ones, often spoke in terms of
imposing the duties flowing from the confidential relationship on both parties
to the contract,"' in practice the doctrine was used to protect women.'" Thus,
in one early case, the court observed that "courts require strict proof of fair-
ness, when called upon to enforce an ante-nuptial contract against the
wife." 1 " In another, the court stated that lalfter betrothal a woman is
presumed to be subject in such matters to the influence of her prospective
husband. . . . " 134 Today, however, antenuptial contract cases, at least those
arising in a divorce context, refer less often to the confidential relationship doc-
trine. Nonetheless, courts continue to apply rules derived from that doctrine. 135
Thus, the extent to which courts have departed from paternalistic assumptions
concerning women's susceptibility to overreaching remains unclear. 135
17 See, e.g., Friedlander v. Friedlander, 80 Wash. 2d 293, 302, 494 P.2d 208, 213-14
(1972); LINDEY, supra note 85, at 90-55.
128
 Note, Antenuptial Contracts, supra note 70, at 32.
129 The confidential relationship is also the source of other special rules applied to these
contracts. Gamble, supra note 70, at 719-20. One such rule is close scrutiny of the contract. See,
e.g., Burtoff v. Burtoff, 418 A.2d 1085, 1089 (D.C. App. 1980); Lutgert v. Lutgert, 338 So. 2d
1111, 1115 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App, 1976). But see Laird v. Laird, 597 P„2d 463, 468 (Wyo. 1979) (re-
jecting close scrutiny of antenuptial contracts "because it springs from the archaic presumption
of inequality of husband and wife").
The confidential relationship is not the only source of the rules governing these antenup-
tial contracts. The state's interest in preventing one spouse from becoming a public charge is
another. See, e.g., Osborne v. Osborne, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2216, 2224, 428 N.E.2d 810,•816
(1981); Unander v. Unander, 265 Or. 102, 107, 506 P.2d 719, 721 (1973). See also Clark, supra
note 7, at 151 (suggesting that the time lag between execution and enforcement of these
agreements is one reason for the courts to scrutinize antenuptial contracts more closely).
"0 Gamble, supra note 70, at 719-20. Gamble states that the courts have taken the view
"that between persons in the premartimonial [sec] state there is a mystical, confidential relation-
ship which anesthetizes the senses of the female partner." Id. at 719. See, e.g., Stilley v, Folger, 14
Ohio 610, 614 (1846); Rocker v. Rocker, 42 Ohio Op. 2d 184, 189 (1967).
'3 ' See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Lipnick, 377 Mass. 666, 671, 389 N.E.2d 385, 388 (1979);
Estate of Serbus v. Serbus, 324 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 1982); Pierce v. Pierce, 71 N.Y. 154,
158 (1877); Kline v. Kline, 57 Pa. 121, 122 (1928).
132 Gamble, supra note 70, at 719-20, 723-26; Babb v. Babb, 604 S.W.2d 574, 578 (Ark.
Ct. App. 1980); In re Estate of Lopata, _Colo. n 6, 641 P.2d 952, 955 n.6 (1982).
'" Pierce v. Pierce, 71 N.Y. 154, 158 (1877).
134 Denison v. Dawes, 121 Me. 402, 404, 117 A. 314, 315 (1922).
15
 See, e.g. , Barnhill v. Barnhill, 386 So. 2d 749, 751 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980) (contract
valid); Ferry v. Ferry, 586 S.W.2d 782, 786-87 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (contract invalid).
16 LINDEY, supra note 85, at 90-49, states that "Times have changed. Women's libera-
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The paternalistic underpinnings of the confidential relationship doctrine
are not its only flaw. Further flaws inhere in the three approaches courts have
used to determine whether a confidential relationship exists between the parties
to an antenuptial contract.'" Some courts, like the Rosenberg court, have irre-
buttably presumed that the parties occupy a confidential relationship.'ss The
vice of this approach is that it fails to take into account marriages of conven-
ience." 9 The second approach finds a confidential relationship when the par-
ties are engaged.'" But commentators suggest that it is anomalous to view the
parties as dealing at arm's length before engagement, yet automatically occu-
pying a confidential relationship immediately thereafter.' 4 ' Third, some courts
look at the particular factual situation to determine whether a confidential
relationship exists.'" The results of this approach are unpredictable."' Final-
tion has had a far-reaching effect." Cases such as Newman, in which the Colorado Supreme
Court presumed that prospective spouses can "act independently and rationally" in entering
antenuptial contracts, bear out this statement. See Newman v. Newman,
653 P.2d 728, 733 (1982). Other cases, however, suggest that times have changed less dramati-
cally. In Lutgert, one Florida district court of appeals voided an antenuptial contract for involun-
tariness on the prospective wife's part. Lutgert v. Lutgert, 338 So. 2d 1111, 1112 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1976). The court acknowledged that the wife could not have been "mesmerized by
prehymeneal ardor" since she had been married twice before. Id. at 1116. Nonetheless, the court
found that the wife had been coerced into signing the contract because the husband "sprang" it
on her twenty-four hours before the wedding, refusing to marry her unless the contract was
signed. Id. The circumstances were, perhaps, less coercive than the court found, for as the court
also noted, the parties had discussed entering an antenuptial contract for "perhaps up to a year
before the marriage." Id. at 1114.
137
 Gamble, supra note 70, at 720-23.
"a See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Lipnick, 377 Mass. 666, 671, 389 N.E.2d 385, 388 (1979);
Friedlander v. Friedlander, 80 Wash. 2d 293, 302, 494 P.2d 208, 213 (1972). Contra In re Mar-
riage of Dawley, 17 Cal. 3d 342, 355, 551 P.2d 323, 331, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3, 11 (1976) (parties not
yet married are not presumed to share a confidential relationship).
19 Gamble, supra note 70, at 720. In jurisdictions which do not irrebuttably presume
that the parties to an antenuptial contract occupy a confidential relationship, disclosure is not re-
quired if the marriage is one of convenience and the contract governs rights upon death. See, e.g. ,
Rocker v. Rocker, 42 Ohio Op. 2d 184, 193 (1967); Lightman v. Magid, 54 Tenn. App. 701,
713, 394 S.W.2d 151, 157 (1965).
'4° See, e.g., Hook v. Hook, 69 Ohio St. 2d 234, 235, 431 N.E.2d 667, 669 (1982);
Denison v. Dawes, 121 Me. 402, 404, 117 A. 314, 315 (1922); Cf. Newman v. Newman, -
Colo. -, 653 P.2d 728, 732 (1982) (engagement creates a fiduciary relationship).
141 Gamble, supra note 70, at 721; Note, Antenuptial Contracts, supra note 70, at 34. Cf.
Ortel v. Gettig, 207 Md. 594, 611-12, 116 A.2d 145, 153 (1955) (noting that it is "anomalous to
say that the instant before a woman signs an antenuptial agreement she deals with her prospec-
tive husband as a stranger, and he with her, but that in the twinkling of an eye, after they append
their signatures to the instrument, a confidential relationship exists between them.").
142 See, e.g., Estate of Serbus v. Serbus, 324 N.W.2d 381, 384 (Minn. 1982); Lightman
v. Magid, 54 Tenn. App. 701, 713, 394 S.W.2d 151, 157 (1965).
143 Gamble, supra note 70, at - 722. As Gamble suggests, courts differ in the weight they
accord such facts as the age of the parties. Id. at 722-23. See, e.g., Estate of Serbus v. Serbus, 324
N.W.2d 381, 383, 385 (Minn. 1982) (prospective husband was sixty-eight, prospective wife,
sixty-five - confidential relationship); Lightman v. Magid, 54 Tenn. App. 701, 710, 713-14,
394 S.W.2d 151, 156-57 (1965) (groom, seventy-one, bride, fifty-eight - no confidential rela-
tionship).
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ly, common to all three approaches is the assumption that courts can determine
when a confidential relationship exists. But given the lack of consensus among
the courts about how to make that identification, that assumption is open to
question. 144
More problematic than identification of the confidential relationship itself
is the effect that courts in the past have seen as following from that relationship.
As Professor Gamble has suggested, courts applying the confidential relation-
ship doctrine generally have begun with a flawed premise."' Women have
been viewed as being incapable of assessing or acting in their own best inter-
ests, so blinded are they by infatuation.' 46
 Thus, the courts, fearing that
women could easily be overreached by the intellectually dominant male,
became the protectors of women. 147
Whatever might once have been said in favor of this view of women, today
it is anachronistic. The confidential relationship doctrine, as Gamble suggests,
accords with neither our society's view of women as men's equals nor with the
nature of the premarital relationship itself. 148
 In enforcing antenuptial con-
tracts governing rights upon death, several courts have explicitly recognized
the validity of Gamble's criticisms. 149 Thus, one court observed that the
burden of fair disclosure imposed on a prospective husband had been "based
on an assumption that the male was the dominant force in the relationship and
that the female was susceptible to his influence."'" In the court's view, there
was "substantial doubt" concerning the accuracy of that assumption.'" Other
144 Gamble, supra note 70, at 723. Gamble states that the lack of consensus among the
courts "seems to affirm that such an identification is beyond any court's ability." Id. But cf.
Clark, supra note 7, at 144, stating that "many courts take the view that prospective spouses are
in a confidential relationship, and this seems clearly correct."
'" Gamble, supra note 70, at 719-20.
I" Id.
Id. at 720; Babb v. Babb, 604 S.W.2d 574, 577 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980); In re Estate of
Burgess, 646 P.2d 623, 625 (Okla. Ct. App. 1982).
' 4° Gamble, supra note 70, at 693, 723.
' 49 Babb v. Babb, 604 S.W.2d 574, 577-79 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980); In re Estate of Lopata,
Colo. n.6, 641 P.2d 952, 954 n.6 (1982); Potter v. Collin, 321 S.W.2d 128, 132
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), In Potter, the court quoted Gamble and concluded that "[i]n this day
and age there is no longer any suggestion that women are unequal and in need of the protective
arm of the court." Id. at 132. Potter enforced an antenuptial contract governing rights upon death
which made a "penurious provision" for the wife, who had signed the contract over her
attorney's objections. Id. at 130-33. In upholding the contract, the Potter court rejected the trial
court's view that in these circumstances a finding of involuntariness could be based on the
woman's being so anxious to marry her prospective husband "that she would have agreed to any
terms" he imposed. Id. at 131-32. In the view of the Potter court, "the courts [were] not free to in-
terfere with lawful but improvident marital agreements knowingly entered into by a person sui
juris." Id. at 131.
15° In re Estate of Lopata, 	 Colo	 ,	 n.6, 641 P.2d 952, 955 n.6 (1982).
"' Id. at n 6, 641 P.2d at 955 n.6. See also In re Estate of Burgess, 646 P.2d 623, 625
(Okla. Ct. App. 1982) ("It will no longer do for courts to look on women who are about to be
married as if they were insensible ninnies, pathetically vulnerable to overreaching by their
fiances and in need of special judicial protection.").
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courts, in enforcing antenuptial contracts upon divorce, have stated that their
former role as protectors of women is no longer appropriate.'"
Insofar as the confidential relationship doctrine has been used as a basis
for scrutinizing the substantive fairness of the contract — and it would seem, as
a basis for relieving some women of contracts they have entered knowingly and
voluntarily' 33
 — the desirability of its continued use is questionable. Over-
reaching can occur in the execution of antenuptial contracts, but since one pur-
pose of such contracts is to limit or waive rights, 1 S 4 the fairness of the contrac-
tual provision is not a reliable indicator of overreaching.'" An approach
preferable to the current one would be to begin with the premise that people are
capable of acting independently and in their own best interests in entering
these contracts.' 56
 Such an approach would be more in accord with our
"2 Spector v. Spector, 23 Ariz. App. 131, 137, 531 P.2d 176, 182 (1975); Parniawski v,
Parniawski, 33 Conn. Supp. 44, 47-48, 359 A.2d 719, 721 (1976). See also the concurring opin-
ion of Justice Schroeder in Ranney v. Ranney, 219 Kan. 428, 434, 548 P.2d 734, 739 (1976),
suggesting that change in constitutional doctrine concerning the rights of women "foreshadows a
requirement that courts shed their overzealous supervisory protecting mantle concerning
women's acts when women exercise their constitutional freedom." Justice Schroeder saw a
changed constitutional doctrine both in the close scrutiny applied by the United States Supreme
Court to statutory classifications based on sex and in a state statute prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of sex. Id. at 434, 548 P.2d at 739.
"3 See, e.g., Babb v. Babb, 604 S.W.2d 574, 577-78 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980) (antenuptial
contract governing rights upon death) noting the possibility and observing that the presumption
of a confidential relationship "which seems to be solely for the protection of women is indicative
of the theme of antenuptial agreement cases, i.e., the intellectual domination by males of
females." The Babb court did not decide whether to reject the presumption of a confidential rela-
tionship in all cases, but held only that in the particular case "a woman who is 57 years old, who
has some business experience and who apparently was concerned about holding on to her prop-
erty which so clearly exceeded in value that of her prospective husband will not be permitted to
excuse her allegedly unknowing entry into an antenuptial agreement by saying she was 'in
love.' " Id. at 577. See also the dissenting opinion of Justice Smith in Burnes v. Burnes, 203 Ark.
334, 343-44, 157 S.W.2d 24, 28-29 (1941) (antenuptial contract governing rights upon death).
Justice Smith, in dissenting from the majority's invalidation of the contract, observed that the
contract was being nullified "solely because of a belief by judges that it is inequitable and (sec-
ondarily) because appellant says it was not explained to her." Id. at 343, 157 S.W.2d at 28. In his
view, by nullifying the contract, the court had established a rule
that a woman may, by means of a written agreement, proceed with marriage and
accept its benefits for thirteen years, or for any other period. She may . . admit to
a witness whose credibility is not impeached that she understood her rights were to
terminate with the death of her husband; then, on second thought, counter with the
unsupported assertion that she did not read the contract, and was therefore not in-
formed.
Id. at 343-44, 157 S.W.2d at 28-29.
"4 See Gamble, supra note 70, at 724-25. See also Clark, supra note 7, at 154, observing
that many antenuptial agreements "are drafted so as merely to read that each spouse waives all
rights which he may have in the property of the other by virtue of the marriage. . . "
1 " See Note, Antenuptiat Contracts, supra note 70, at 41 ("every antenuptial contract is un-
fair at least by the legislative standards indicated in the laws of descent and distribution").
16 See, e.g. , Newman v. Newman, Colo 653 P.2d 728, 733 (1982)
(terming the relationship confidential but stating that "there is an assumption in the law that the
parties are essentially able to act independently and rationally concerning their present and
future property interests in relation to their prospective marriage").
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society's view of women and of the premarital relationship. It would also
recognize that many who use these contracts have been married before'" and
thus can be expected to be aware of the rights they would have upon divorce in
the absence of an antenuptial contract.'"
By beginning with the premise that those who use these antenuptial con-
tracts are capable of contracting independently and rationally, courts could
take a significant step toward adopting rules making the enforceability of ante-
nuptial contracts more certain. Ironically, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court adopted the confidential relationship doctrine and its fair disclosure rules
at a time when a few jurisdictions have begun to question the soundness of
both.'" The language the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court used in
Rosenberg to adopt the confidential relationship doctrine is, perhaps, flexible
enough for the court to also adopt the premise that the parties to an antenuptial
contract are able to contract independently and rationally. 160 Whether the
court will do so can only be answered in future cases.
B. Fair Disclosure
The first restriction which the Osborne court placed on antenuptial con-
tracts governing rights upon divorce is premised on the confidential relation-
ship doctrine.' 6 ' In Osborne, the court stated that to be valid, these antenuptial
contracts must meet Rosenberg's fair disclosure rules.'" Under these rules, each
party to an antenuptial contract has the duty of disclosing to the other the
amount, character, and value of his or her assets.'"
1d7 Clark, supra note 7, at 141.
158 See, e.g., Newman v. Newman, _ Colo. _„ 653 P.2d 728, 733 (1982). In
enforcing the contract in Newman over the wife's claims of unconscionability and fraud, the Colo-
rado Supreme Court noted that the wife "was a mature person who had once before been
through the financial difficulties of a divorce" and that she had "decided not to obtain indepen-
dent counsel." Id. at , 653 P.2d at 733.
18 See, e.g., In re Estate of Lopata, _ Colo.	 n 6, 641 P.2d 952, 954 n.6
(1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. 732.702(2) (West 1976).
' 60 377 Mass. 666, 671-73, 389 N.E.2d 385, 388-89 (1979).
16 ' See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
162 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2216, 2224, 428 N.E.2d 810, 816 (1981).
Compliance with Rosenberg's fair disclosure rules should establish not only the validity
but also the enforceability of an antenuptial contract litigated in an estate context. See Rosenberg
v. Lipnick, 377 Mass. 666, 671-72, 389 N.E.2d 385, 388-89 (1979). If an antenuptial contract is
litigated in a divorce context, however, compliance with Rosenberg's fair disclosure rules will
establish only its validity, not its enforceability. Osborne v. Osborne, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2216,
2224, 428 N.E.2d 810, 816 (1981). The fair provision discussed in this section refers to a provi-
sion which was fair at the date of the contract's execution. Such a provision will establish the
validity of an antenuptial contract litigated in a divorce context. Id. at 2224, 428 N.E.2d at 816.
The fairness discussed in section C infra, at text accompanying notes 195-201, refers to fairness at
the time of enforcement. Such fairness is necessary to establish the enforceability of an antenup-
tial contract litigated in a divorce context. Osborne v. Osborne, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2216,
2224, 428 N.E.2d 810, 816 (1981).
16 ' Rosenberg v. Lipnick, 377 Mass. 666, 670, 389 N.E.2d 385, 388 (1979).
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Despite Rosenberg's emphasis on disclosure, this requirement does not
seem to be absolute.'" The fair disclosure rules delineated in Rosenberg appear
to be in substance the majority rule for determining the validity of antenuptial
contracts governing rights upon death. 168 Under the majority rule, a contract is
valid if one of the following alternative requirements is met. First, a contract
will be valid if it contains a fair and reasonable monetary provision for the par-
ty contesting the contract as measured at the date of the contract's execution.'"
Second, in the absence of a fair provision, the contract will be valid if prior to
its execution, the party contesting the contract was fully informed of the other
party's worth.' 67 Finally, in the absence of either a fair provision or disclosure,
the contract will be valid if, prior to its execution, the party contesting the con-
tract had independent knowledge of the other party's worth.' 68 Since Osborne
164 In Rosenberg, the husband had not disclosed his assets to his prospective wife prior to
the contract's execution. Id. at 668, 389 N.E.2d at 386. Rosenberg's fair disclosure rules did not
apply to the antenuptial contract at issue, since those rules apply on a prospective basis. Id. at
667-78, 389 N.E.2d at 386. The court noted, however, that even if the contract's validity were
determined under the new rules, the contract might well have been enforceable, since the wife
was advised by counsel that she should request disclosure but decided not to for fear it might
result in no marriage." Id. at 672-73, 389 N.E.2d at 389.
'6s
	 stating that the parties would be viewed as occupying a confidential relation-
ship and imposing on both the duty of disclosure, the court in Rosenberg listed several other factors
which it may consider in determining the validity of an antenuptial contract. Id. at 671-72, 389
N.E.2d at 388. Thus, the court stated that it may consider whether:
(1) the contract contains a fair and reasonable provision as measured at the time of
its execution for the party contesting the agreement;. (2) the contesting party was ful-
ly informed of the other party's worth prior to the agreement's execution, or had, or
should have had, independent knowledge of the other party's worth; and (3) a
waiver by the contesting party is set forth.
Id. at 672, 389 N.E.2d at 388. The first and second factors in Rosenberg, excluding the alternative
test of constructive knowledge, state the majority rule. In addition, in a footnote to the factors the
court may consider in determining the validity of an antenuptial contract, the Rosenberg court
cited cases from other jurisdictions following the majority rule. Id. at 672 n.3, 389 N.E.2d at 388
n.3 (1979), citing Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1962); Hartz v. Hartz, 248
Md. 47, 234 A.2d 865 (1967); In re Kaufman's Estate, 404 Pa. 131, 171 A.2d 48 (1961); in re Mc-
Clellan's Estate, 365 Pa. 401, 75 A.2d 595 (1950); Friedlander v. Friedlander, 80 Wash. 2d 293,
494 P.2d 208 (1972) (antenuptial contract governing property rights upon divorce).
166 See, e.g., Hartz v. Hartz, 248 Md. 47, 56-58, 234 A.2d 865, 870-72 (1967); Schut-
terle v. Schutterle, 260 N.W.2d 341, 348 (S.D. 1977).
The fairness and reasonableness of the contractual provision is determined in reference
to the parties' respective worth, ages, intelligence, literacy, business acumen and prior family ties
or commitments. Rosenberg v. Lipnick, 377 Mass. 666, 672, 389 N.E.2d 385, 389 (1979). In
jurisdictions which follow the majority rule, a fair provision for the party contesting the contract
indicates that he or she was not overreached and thus renders the contract valid in the absence of
disclosure. See, e.g., Hartz v. Hartz, 248 Md. 47, 58, 234 A.2d 865, 871-72 (1967).
1" See, e.g., Schutterle v. Schutterle, 260 N.W.2d 341, 348 (S.D. 1977). Other jurisdic-
tions have indicated that the disclosure need not be of the exact value of each party's assets.
Rather, it must be a full and fair disclosure of all material facts so that an intelligent decision
about whether to sign the contract can be made. See, e.g. , Estate of Friedman, 483 Pa. 614, 628,
398 A.2d 615, 622 (1978); Friedlander v. Friedlander, 80 Wash. 2d 293, 302, 494 P.2d 208, 214
(1972).
'" The courts recognize that an intelligent waiver of statutory rights can be made by a
party who had general knowledge of the other party's worth. See, e.g., Hartz v. Hartz, 248 Md.
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establishes that the validity of antenuptial contracts governing rights upon
divorce will be judged under Rosenberg's fair disclosure rules,' 69 it seems that
the validity of these contracts will be determined in accordance with the rule
applied by a majority of courts to antenuptial contracts governing rights upon
death.'"
Because there are as yet no Massachusetts cases applying the majority
rule, the effect of this rule on the validity of a litigated antenuptial contract is
unclear. Cases from other jurisdictions do, however, shed some light on its ef-
fect. Analysis of the cases suggests that application of the majority rule creates
uncertainty concerning the validity of any antenuptial contract. 17 '
As one step in determining whether an antenuptial contract is valid, a court
applying the majority rule will examine the fairness of the contractual provision
for the party contesting the contract. I 72
 Fairness is determined as of the date of
the contract's execution.'" The highly discretionary nature of a fairness stand-
ard has led to unpredictable results. 14 Cases from jurisdictions other than
Massachusetts have differed concerning what constitutes a fair and reasonable
provision for the party contesting the contract. In one court's view, if the mar-
riage was short, an antenuptial contract would be fair if it allow[ed] each
spouse to live as well as before the marriage." '" But other courts have focused
on the prospective husband's worth in determining whether the contractual
provision is fair.'"
The fairness standard's inconsistency offers little assurance that any
antenuptial contract will be found valid. Critics of this standard have suggested
47, 56-57, 234 A.2d 865, 870-71 (1967); In re Estate of Youngblood v. Youngblood, 457 S.W.2d
750, 756-57 (Mo. 1970).
160 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2216, 2224, 428 N.E.2d 810, 816 (1981).
"° Several other jurisdictions apply this rule to antenuptial contracts governing rights
upon divorce. See, e.g., Barnhill v. Barnhill, 386 So. 2d 749, 751 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980) (contracts
governing alimony or property rights); Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 385 (Fla. 1970) (same);
Friedlander v. Friedlander, 80 Wash. 2d 293, 302, 494 P.2d 308, 214 (1972) (holding limited to
contracts governing property rights).
17 ' See Gamble, supra note 70, at 729.
"2 Lutgert v. Lutgert, 338 So. 2d 1111, 1116 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976). See also Burtoff
v. Burtoff, 418 A.2d 1085, 1089 (D.C. App. 1980) ("[t)he starting point of our examination is
the contract's fairness").
'" See, e.g., Estate of Youngblood v. Youngblood, 457 S.W:2d 750, 756 (Mo. 1970).
"4 See Gamble, supra note 70, at 724-25; Note, Antenuptial Contracts, supra note 70, at 41.
"5 Burtoff v. Burtoff, 418 A.2d 1085, 1089 (D.C. App. 1980). The court noted, how-
ever, that it might apply a different fairness standard if the marriage had been a long term one.
Id. at 1089 n.3. Thus, the court suggested that in the case of a long term marriage, the parties'
standard of living during the marriage might be used to measure fairness. Id. The use of two dif-
ferent standards for determining the fairness of the antenuptial contract will make it difficult for
the parties to plan realistically for the financial consequences of divorce.
16 Posner v. Posner, 257 So. 2c1 530, 534 (Fla. 1972) (the court also considered the fair-
ness of the contract's provision in relation to the marital standard of living); Plant v. Plant, 320
So. 2d 455, 457 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (the court also considered the premarital standard of
living of the party seeking to enforce the contract).
A further inconsistency in the cases concerns the burden of proof. In some jurisdictions,
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that it can be used by courts to invalidate contracts they simply dislike.'" Cases
reaching different results on similar facts offer some support for this theory.'"
if the court determines that the contractual provision for the party contesting the antenuptial con-
tract is unfair, a presumption of nondisclosure or involuntariness is raised and the burden of
proof on these issues is shifted to the party seeking to enforce the contract. See, e.g. , Lutgert v.
Lutgert, 338 So. 2d 1111, 1115-16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976). See also Hosmer v. Hosmer, 611
S.W.2d 32, 35-36 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980), in which the court recognized that the cases in its own
jurisdiction were inconsistent on the question of who bore the burden of proof. The Hosmer court
did not resolve the question. Instead, the court simply concluded that the contract was invalid,
regardless of which party bore the burden of proof. Id. at 36.
A footnote in Rosenberg v. Lipnick, 377 Mass. 666, 672 n.3, 389 N.E.2d 385, 388 n.3
(1979), suggests that the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts may adopt a shifting burden
of proof linked to the fairness of the contractual provision for the party contesting the contract
and may join that shifting burden of proof to presumptions of nondisclosure or involuntariness.
All of the cases cited in the Rosenberg footnote, including one concerning the validity of an ante-
nuptial contract governing rights upon divorce, initially place the burden of proof on the party
contesting the contract, but raise a presumption of nondisclosure or involuntariness and shift the
burden of proof if the contractual provision is found to be unfair. Id. at 672 n.3, 389 N.E.2d at
388 n.3 (citing Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1962); Guhl v. Guhl, 376 III.
100, 33 N.E.2d 444 (1941); In re Estate of Parish, 236 Iowa 822, 20 N.W.2d 32 (1945); Burns v.
Spiker, 109 Kan. 22, 202 P. 370 (1921); Denison v. Dawes, 121 Me. 402, 117 A. 314 (1922); In re
McClellan's Estate, 365 Pa. 401, 75 A.2d 595 (1950); Friedlander v. Friedlander, 80 Wash. 2d
293, 494 P.2d 208 (1972); Bibelhausen v. Bibelhausen, 159 Wis. 365, 150 N.W. 516 (1915)).
t" See Note, Antenuptial Contracts, supra note 70, at 36 (observing that in the context of
antenuptial contracts governing rights upon death, the alternative requirement that the contract
contain a fair provision for the wife has been used "as a device to strike down, on a notion of
fairness, a contract which is otherwise valid").
"u Compare Lutgert v. Lutgert, 338 So. 2d 1111 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) with Osborne
v. Osborne, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2216, 428 N.E.2d 810 (1981). In both cases the party con-
testing the validity of the contract claimed that he or she had signed the antenuptial contract
under duress. Lutgert v. Lutgert, 338 So. 2d 1111, 1116; Osborne v. Osborne, 1981 Mass. Adv.
Sh. 2216, 2226, 428 N.E.2d 810, 817 (1981). In both, the party contesting the contract was
aware of the other party's wealth. Lutgert v. Lutgert, 338 So. 2d 1111, 1115 ("Nile wife was ful-
ly aware before the marriage, of course, that the husband was a man of great wealth . . ");
Osborne v. Osborne, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2216, 2226 n.8, 428 N.E.2d 810, 817 n.8 (the extent
and nature of the prospective wife's assets were fully disclosed to her husband). In addition, the
parties in each case had discussed entering an antenuptial contract at some time prior to the con-
tract's execution. Lutgert v. Lutgert, 338 So. 2d 1111, 1114 ("the subject of an antenuptial
agreement had been brought up on more than one occasion for perhaps up to a year before the
marriage . . . "); Osborne v. Osborne, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2216, 2226, 428 N.E.2d 810, 817
("at some point after [the couple's) engagement and before the weddding they had discussed the
antenuptial agreement"). Finally, both antenuptial contracts were executed just prior to the
wedding. Lutgert v. Lutgert, 338 So. 2d 1111, 1116 ("husband sprang the agreement upon the
wife and demanded its execution within twenty-four hours of the wedding"); Osborne v.
Osborne, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2216, 2226, 428 N.E.2d 810, 817 (1981) (husband "saw the con-
tract for the first time a few hours before the wedding ceremony when it was presented to him by
his wife's attorney for signing"). See also Reply Brief of Appellant at 7, Osborne v. Osborne, 1981
Mass. Adv. Sh. 2216, 428 N.E.2d 810 (1981) (husband "was summarily summonsed by the
wife's attorney during a formal wedding luncheon party . . ."). In Lutgert, the court voided the
contract for involuntariness on the wife's part, noting that the husband had in effect issued the
ultimatum "No ageement, no wedding." Lutgert v. Lutgert, 338 So. 2d 1111, 1116. To the
court, this "ultimatum" was sufficiently coercive to overcome the wife's volition. Id. In Osborne,
in contrast, the contract was found valid, the court finding that there was "ample evidence" to
support the master's finding that the husband had entered the contract voluntarily. Osborne v.
Osborne, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2216, 2226, 428 N.E.2d 810, 817 (1981).
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If a contract does not contain a fair provision for the party contesting its
validity, that party's actual or constructive knowledge cif the other's worth will
render the contract valid. 19 But the cases differ on what facts are sufficient to
demonstrate the contesting party's actual or constructive knowledge of the
other's worth. 1 "D One court regarded the fact that the parties to an antenuptial
contract lived together before marriage as a factor indicating that the wife had
constructive knowledge of her intended husband's means."' Another court,
however, while recognizing that constructive knowledge of the other's worth
will render a contract valid, found an antenuptial contract invalid without dis-
cussing whether the wife had such knowledge where the parties lived together
before the marriage."'
If prior to a contract's execution, the party seeking to enforce the contract
has fully disclosed his or her worth to the other party, that in itself should
render the contract valid because it indicates a knowing waiver by the party
contesting the contract of his or her rights.'" The Osborne court looked favor-
ably on an itemized list, attached to the antenuptial contract, which fully
disclosed the extent and nature of the assets of the spouse who sought to enforce
the contract.'" But absent such a list, the adequacy of disclosure becomes an
issue.'" Under the majority rule, independent knowledlge of the other party's
worth or a fair contractual provision will render the contract valid despite lack
of disclosure.'" The determination of what constitutes a fair provision is,
however, a subjective one."' Further, cases are inconsistent concerning what
facts are sufficient to establish independent knowledge.'" It is not surprising,
then, that lack of disclosure is one ground on which many contracts are found
invalid. "g
The different results in the two cases could, perhaps, be explained by one difference in
the facts found. In Lutgert, the wife objected to signing the contract when it was presented to her.
Lutgert v. Lutgert, 338 So, 2d 1111, 1117. The husband in Osborne did not. See Reply Brief of Ap-
pellant at 8, Osborne v. Osborne, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2216, 428 N.E.2d 810 (1981). An equal-
ly plausible theory, however, is that the court in Lutgert assumed the traditional role of women's
protector.
'" See, e.g. , Rosenberg v. Lipnick, 377 Mass. 666, 672, 389 N.E.2d 385, 388 (1979); In
re Estate of Youngblood v. Youngblood, 457 S.W.2d 750, 756 (Mo. 1970).
1 " Note, Antenuptial Contracts, supra note 70, at 39.
151 In re Marriage of Cohn, 18 Wash. App. 502, 508, 569 P.2d 79, 83 (1977).
"' Hosmer v. Hosmer, 611 S.W.2d 32, 35-37 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
183 See, e.g., Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17, 20-21 (Fla. 1962).
184 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2216, 2226 n.8, 428 N.E.2d 810, 817 n.8 (1981).
'" See, e.g., Friedlander v. Friedlander, 80 Wash. 2d 293, 302, 494 P.2d 208, 214 (1972)
(contract found invalid). See also Laird v. Laird, 597 P.2d 463, 467-68 (Wyo. 1979) (enforcing the
contract and noting that "[t]here are a multitude of cases on the matter of financial disclo-
sure. . . . The decisions in those cases are as various, and in many cases as wondrous, as are
these facts" [prospective husband knew his wife had substantial wealth when he executed the
antenuptial contract.]).
186 See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
18? See supra notes 172-78 and accompanying text.
1" See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
189 See, e.g., Norris v. Norris, 419 A.2d 982, 983-84 (D.C. App. 1980); Weintraub v.
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In that disclosure has been required to assure an intelligent waiver of
rights by a prospective spouse, 19° some sort of disclosure rule seems inevitable
in the context of antenuptial contracts governing rights upon divorce."' But
the desirability of requiring prospective spouses to disclose to one another the
value of their assets should, perhaps, be reexamined. 192 If the disclosure re-
quirement is to be continued, some procedure allowing the prospective spouses
to establish disclosure upon entering the contract should be adopted. Adoption
of such a procedure would offer some protection for a party giving up rights
under the contract, since he or she would waive rights with knowledge of the
other's assets. By establishing that disclosure had occurred, such a procedure
would also offer some protection for a party seeking to safeguard assets.
At present, however, there is no such statutory procedure in Massachu-
setts. Thus, to establish the validity of an antenuptial contract, prospective
spouses must comply with Rosenberg's fair disclosure rules. These rules, in sum-
mary, seem to require that the party contesting the contract entered the con-
tract with knowledge of the other's worth or, alternatively, that the contractual
provision was fair at the time of the contract's execution.'" Knowledge will be
established by showing that disclosure took place or that the party contesting
the contract had actual or constructive knowledge of the other's worth.' 94
C. Fair at the Time of Enforcement
An antenuptial contract found valid under the fair disclosure rules incor-
porated in Osborne will not necessarily be enforceable. As its second broad
Weintraub, 417 So.2d 629, 629 (Fla. 1982); Plant v. Plant, 320 So. 2d 455, 457 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1975); Ferry v. Ferry, 586 S.W.2d 782, 787 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); In re Marriage of Norris,
51 Or. App. 43,'624 P.2d 636, 640 (1981).
19° LINDEY, supra note 85, at 90-55 to 90-56.
191 One legislature has rejected the requirement of disclosure for antenuptial contracts
governing rights on death. FLA. STAT. ANN. $ 732.702(2) (West 1976). That statute, which is
part of the state's probate code, provides as follows:
Each spouse shall make a fair disclosure to the other of his or her estate if
the agreement, contract, or waiver is executed after marriage. No disclosure shall be
required for an agreement, contract, or waiver executed before marriage. (emphasis
added)
The Florida Supreme Court has held, however, that the disclosure requirement still applies to
antenuptial contracts litigated in a divorce context. Weintraub v. Weintraub, 417 So. 2d 629,
629 (Fla. 1982). In doing so, the court observed that the rationale for not requiring disclosure in
an estate context did not apply to divorce cases. Id. at 631. If a contract were challenged in an
estate context, the court noted, the estate might find it difficult to prove disclosure after the
wealthy spouse's death. Id. In a divorce case, however, both spouses would be available to testify
on the issue of disclosure. Id.
' 92 See Gamble, supra note 70, at 733-34 n.150, stating as follows:
[a] listing of the properties without the corresponding estimated values would be
preferable because (1) estimated evaluation invites both conscious and mistaken
underevaluation and thus invites attack upon these agreements; (2) it would appear
to be no overwhelming burden for a contracting spouse, usually the wife, to make,
on the basis of the listed property, his (her) own evaluation of what he (she) is giving
up.
199 See supra notes 162-68 and accompanying text.
194 See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
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restriction on antenuptial contracts, the Osborne court established that these
contracts would be binding on the courts to the same extent as postnuptial
separation agreements. 195 Thus, the Osborne court stated that, in order to be en-
forceable, an antenuptial contract governing alimony or property rights upon
divorce must be fair and reasonable at the time of the judgment nisi.' 96
Requiring the terms of an antenuptial contract to meet a discretionary
fairness and reasonableness standard at this later date is the most significant
restriction which the Osborne court imposed on the freedom of the parties to
enter a binding and enforceable antenuptial contract. This restriction requires
those entering these contracts to determine how much circumstances may
change between the time of the contract's execution and the time of its enforce-
195
 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2216, 2224, 428 N.E.2d 810, 816 (1981).
196 Id. at 2224, 428 N.E.2d at 816, This restriction also governs the enforceability of
postnuptial separation agreements in Massachusetts. The Osborne court, in establishing that this
restriction would also apply to antenuptial contracts governing rights upon divorce, cited an
earlier Supreme Judicial Court decision which set forth rules to govern postnuptial separation
agreements See Knox v. Remick, 371 Mass. 433, 436-37, 358 N.E.2d 432, 435-36 (1976). The
Osborne court's decision to apply the rules governing postnuptial separation agreements to these
antenuptial contracts is in line with a trend in the cases. See Clark, supra note 7, at 151 (observing
that "the rules for antenuptial agreements are being assimilated to those applicable to separation
agreements"). But the Osborne court's decision differs from decisions in other jurisdictions in that
Osborne explicitly requires the contract to be fair as of the date of enforcement. Clark observes that
[w]hile the cases following Posner all insist that the antenuptial agreement must be
fair and must make adequate provision for the spouses, they have yet to face one
remaining question . 	 . are the fairness and adequacy of the agreement to be
determined as of the date on which the agreement was executed, or as of the date on
which enforcement is sought, or perhaps as of both dates?
Clark, supra note 7, at 151. Clark suggests that either fairness or conscionability be required as of
both dates. Id. at 151 & n.50.
Two cases permitting antenuptial contracts governing alimony and property rights upon
divorce may in effect require the contract to be fair and reasonable at the time of enforcement. See
Burtoff v. Burtoff, 418 A.2d 1085, 1089 (D.C. App. 1980). In Burtoff, the court stated that the
fairness of the contract would be judged in light of many of the factors governing alimony
awards, including the duration of the marriage. Id. Thus, the Burtoff court suggested that it may
employ two different standards for measuring the contract's fairness. If the marriage is short, the
contract "will be considered fair if it allows each spouse to live as well as before the marriage."
Id. If the marriage is "of many years' duration," the contract may be fair if it "enable[s] the
spouse to live according to the standard established during the marriage." Id. at 1089 n.3. The
Burtoff court further observed that its opinion did not address the question of modification of the
contract. Id. at 1089 n.4. See also Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 385 (Fla. 1970) (stating that
the questions of the binding effect of a valid contract and of modification of the contract should be
decided under the law governing postnuptial separation agreements).
New York requires by statute that the maintenance provisions of antenuptial agreements
be "fair and reasonable at the time of the making of the agreement and . . not unconscionable
at the time of entry of final judgment." N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW S 236(B)(3) (Consol. 1981-1982).
The proposed Uniform Marital Property Act of 1981 would also require that antenuptial con-
tracts not be unconscionable at the time of division of property. UMPA, supra note 3, at S 16(a).
One jurisdiction has explicitly established that fairness will be determined as of the date
of the contract's execution, but that jurisdiction allows antenuptial contracts governing property
rights only. See Spector v. Spector, 23 Ariz. App. 131, 140, 531 P.2d 176, 185 (1975).
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ment and what a court will view as fair.'" Thus, the restriction may make con-
tracting out of the equitable distribution system almost impossible.
The fairness and reasonableness standard applied to separation
agreements, and now, under Osborne, applicable to antenuptial contracts gov-
erning rights upon divorce, is vague. The Osborne court did not suggest what
criteria would be used to judge fairness and reasonableness. However, in Mas-
sachusetts, when a divorce is sought on the ground of irretrievable breakdown
of the marriage, the court is required by statute to judge the propriety of the
provisions in the parties' separation agreement for support, alimony, and
disposition of marital property in reference in the state's equitable distribution
statute.' 98 Since the Osborne court has decided to apply the rules governing
separation agreements to these antenuptial contracts,' 99 a Massachusetts court
faced with judging the fairness and reasonableness of an antenuptial contract
governing rights upon divorce may well look to the equitable distribution
statute.
Yet, if courts determine the validity of antenuptial contracts governing
rights upon divorce by reference to the equitable distribution statute, it seems
unlikely that many such contracts could be deemed fair and reasonable. One of
the primary reasons for entering an antenuptial contract is to limit or waive
rights created by state marital or property law. 2" Thus, the requirement that
the contract be fair and reasonable at the time of its enforcement frustrates one
of the purposes of these antenuptial contracts. It also thwarts realistic planning
for the financial consequences of divorce. The requirement that the contract be
fair and reasonable at the time of its enforcement is intended to take into ac-
count changes in circumstances between the time of the contract's execution
and the time of its enforcement. 20 ' But the desirability of applying this discre-
tionary standard to an antenuptial contract which the parties have freely
entered is highly questionable.
D. Modification of the Contract
As its third restriction on the enforceability of antenuptial contracts gov-
erning alimony and property rights upon divorce, the Osborne court established
197 See Klarman, supra note 10, at 403.
199 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 208, 5 lA (West 1981). The statute provides in rele-
vant part that
[a]fter a hearing on a separation agreement which has been presented to the court,
the court shall, within thirty days of said hearing, make a finding as to . . whether
or not the agreement has made proper provisions for custody, for support and
maintenance, for alimony and for the disposition of marital property, where ap-
plicable. In making its finding, the court shall apply the provisions of [the equitable
distribution statute] . . .
See supra note 33 for the text of the equitable distribution statute.
199
 See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
200 See supra note 154 for authority.
291
 Clark, supra note 7, at 151.
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that courts may modify these contracts in certain situations, for example,
where one spouse is or will become a public charge if the contract is specifically
enforced. 202
 This restriction, like the others, creates uncertainty concerning the
enforceability of antenuptial contracts. The uncertainty arises in part because
the Osborne court did not explicitly identify the standard it will use to determine
when or whether a contract should be modified. Since the court did not do so,
its opinion leaves unclear the circumstances in which courts may modify these
antenuptial contracts.
In stating that courts may modify these contracts in certain situations, 203
the Osborne court may have intended to suggest that an antenuptial contract
governing rights upon divorce may be modified to make it fair and reasonable
at the time of its initial enforcement. The example linked to the court's state-
ment concerning modification, a spouse who would be a public charge if the
contract were specifically enforced, 204 may define the court's standard of
fairness and reasonableness. The contract, therefore, would be modified to the
extent necessary to make it fair and reasonable, that is, only to the extent
necessary to prevent a spouse from becoming a public charge. Although this in-
terpretation is plausible, a spouse who would be a public charge probably falls
under a not unconscionable standard, rather than a fairness standard. 205 Thus,
the court's public charge example is only an example and does not define its
fairness standard. An antenuptial contract, then, might be subject to con-
siderable modification to make it fair and reasonable at the time of its initial en-
forcement.
The Osborne court's statement concerning modification is open to another
interpretation. In establishing that antenuptial contracts governing rights upon
202 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2216, 2224, 428 N.E.2d 810, 816 (1981). The court also
established that the courts may modify the contract if a provision affecting the custody of a child is
not in the child's best interest. Id. at 2224, 428 N.E.2d at 816. The Osborne court is surely right in
viewing the best interests of the child as paramount to the contractual freedom of the parties. The
state's interest in the welfare of a minor child is stronger than its interest in the welfare of an ex-
spouse. See Knox v. Remick, 371 Mass. 433, 437, 358 N.E.2d 432, 436 (1976). The state's in-
terest is particularly strong when the contract is an antenuptial one, since the parties to such con-
tracts cannot themselves foresee where the child's interests will lie. Thus, if the custody of a child
is contested at the time of the contract's initial enforcement, the courts should have the power to
determine which spouse shall have custody of the child, notwithstanding the provisions of the
agreement. In addition, the courts should retain power to modify contractual provisions for child
support both at the time of the contract's initial enforcement and at a later time. The right to sup-
port is the child's right, as the Osborne court implicitly recognized by citing Knox v. Remick.
Osborne v. Osborne, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2216, 2224, 428 N.E.2d 810, 816 (1981), citing Knox
v. Remick, 371 Mass. 433, 358 N.E.2d 432 (1976). In Knox, the Supreme Judicial Court recog-
nized that provisions in a separation agreement fixing child support stood on a "different
footing" than provisions fixing spousal support: "[p]arents may not bargain away the rights of
their children to support from either one of them." 371 Mass. 433, 437, 358 N. E.2d 432, 436
(1976).
203
 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2216, 2224, 428 N.E.2d 810, 816 (1981).
2" Id. at 2224, 428 N. E.2d at 816.
2°' See, e.g., N .Y . DOM. REL. LAW $ 236(B)(3) (Consul. 1981-1982). For the pertinent
part of that statute, see supra note 196.
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divorce would be subject to modification, the court may have been referring to
later modification of a contract originally found fair and reasonable and thus
enforceable. The Osborne court's restriction allowing modification of an
antenuptial contract in certain situations, for example, where one spouse
would be a public charge if the contract were specifically enforced, also applies
to postnuptial separation agreements. 206 In establishing that this restriction
now would apply to antenuptial contracts governing rights upon divorce, the
Osborne court cited Knox v. Remick, 207 an earlier Supreme Judicial Court deci-
sion involving the modification of a postnuptial separation agreement. Knox in
dicta set forth a rule to govern actions in which one party later sought spousal
support in excess of the amount provided in the parties' postnuptial separation
agreement. 208
 That rule is, in substance, the rule the Osborne court may have
adopted to determine whether the courts should modify an antenuptial contract
governing rights upon divorce. The Knox court's statement of the rule and the
reasons underlying the rule shed some light on the modification of these ante-
nuptial contracts.
The rule set forth in Knox established that if the postnuptial separation
agreement had been fair and reasonable at the time of the judgment nisi, then
the spousal "support provisions should be specifically enforced, absent
countervailing equities." 2°8 As the primary instance of a countervailing equity,
the Knox court set forth a spouse who is or would become a public charge if the
agreement were specifically enforced. 2 " In that instance, the Knox court
observed, the court could order spousal support pursuant to its statutory
authority, 2 " "not specifically enforcing the separation agreement to the point
where the separation agreement would be used to impose support obligations
on the taxpayers of the Commonwealth. " 212 Although the Knox court sug-
gested that there might be other equities which would warrant a denial of
specific enforcement of the agreement's spousal support provision, 2 " the deci-
sion suggests that this provision of the agreement will be accorded considerable
finality. 214 The Knox court, in adopting this rule to govern specific enforce-
2" See infra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.
2° 7 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2216, 2224, 428 N.E.2d 810, 816 (1981), citing Knox v.
Remick, 371 Mass. 433, 358 N.E.2d 432 (1976).
2" 371 Mass. 433, 436-37, 358 N.E.2d 432, 435-36 (1976).
209
 Id. at 436-37, 358 N.E.2d at 435-36.
210 Id. at 437, 358 N.E.2d at 436.
2" Id. If the judgment nisi contained a provision for alimony, the courts have authority
to modify that provision under Massachusetts General Laws chapter 208, section 37. MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 208, S 37 (West 1981). In modifying the alimony provision, the court con-
siders the factors set forth in the equitable distribution statute. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208,
5 34 (West 1981). If no provision for alimony was made at the time of divorce, the court has
authority to order alimony under the equitable distribution statute. For the text of that statute,
see supra note 33.
72 371 Mass. 433, 437, 358 N.E.2d 432, 436.
"3 Id. at 437, 358 N.E.2d at 436.
214 A more recent decision also suggests that the spousal support provisions of a separa-
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ment, observed that it saw no reason why parties to a separation agreement
could "not agree to a permanent resolution of their mutual rights and obliga-
tions, including support obligations between them. 212
The Osborne court, in establishing that the courts may modify antenuptial
contracts governing rights upon divorce in certain situations, for example,
where one spouse is or will become a public charge, 216 may have in substance
adopted the Knox rule. If the Osborne court has done so, it has established that if
the antenuptial contract was fair and reasonable at the time of the judgment
nisi, it will not usually be modified at a later date. The Osborne court's adoption
of this rule would also mean, however, that an antenuptial contract will always
be subject to modification at a later date, even if it was fair and reasonable at
the time of the judgment nisi. Thus, even if the antenuptial contract was in-
itially enforceable, the party who sought the protection of the contract can
never be certain that the courts will not modify the contract later to prevent an
ex-spouse from becoming a public charge. The court's retention of authority to
modify the contract in this situation is, admittedly, an expression of the public
policies underlying the laws governing separation agreements. 217 But this rule,
which allows modification of the antenuptial contract at any later date, in effect
may require one ex-spouse to serve as a private insurer for the other, perhaps
long after the marriage has ended in divorce. A recent Massachusetts Court of
Appeals decision illustrates the inequities of the rule that allows modification to
prevent an ex-spouse from becoming a public charge.
In Talbot v. Talbot„ 218 a wife sought alimony more than eight years after
the divorce judgment. 219 No alimony had been ordered in the divorce
- decree."° The probate judge dismissed the wife's later complaint for
alimony, 221 finding that she was " 'capable of meeting her usual needs without
support from the husband. ' "222 The Appeals Court reversed and
remanded, 2" noting that this finding was clearly erroneous. 224 The Appeals
don agreement will be accorded considerable finality. In Stansel, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court held that " 'any countervailing equities' interposed by the party seeking to avoid
the effect of the separation agreement must be at least as compelling as these [Knox's] two
grounds if that party is to prevail." Stansel v. Stansel, 385 Mass. 510, 516, 432 N.E.2d 691, 695
(1982). The first ground referred to by the Stansel court was a spouse who is or would become a
public charge if the agreement were specifically enforced. Id. at 515, 432 N.E.2d at 695. The sec-
ond was a spouse raising the agreement as a bar to modification who had not complied with the
provisions of the agreement. Id. The court cited Osborne as being in accord with its decision in
Stansel. Id. at 515-16, 432 N.E.2d at 695.
212
	 at 436, 358 N.E.2d at 435.
216 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2216, 2224, 428 N.E.2d 810, 816 (1981).
2 " Id. at 2224, 428 N.E.2d at 816.
212 Talbot v. Talbot, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 456, 434 N.E.2d 215 (1982).
219
	 at 456-57, 434 N.E.2d at 216. The marriage itself had lasted approximately six
years. Id. at 456, 434 N.E.2d at 216.
220 Id.
221 Id. at 457, 434 N.E.2d at 216.
222 Id. at 458, 434 N.E.2d at 217.
222 Id. at 460, 434 N.E.2d at 218.
22+ M. at 458, 434 N.E.2d at 217. The Appeals Court observed that it was obvious that
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Court also observed that the trial judge's conclusion was based on an error of
law in that despite a judge's broad discretion under the equitable distribution
statute, "a judge may not ignore the policy expressed in our cases which 'pro-
tects the public from the burden of assuming the support obligations of [a]
. . . spouse who is able to pay.' "2" The court noted that even a fair and
reasonable separation agreement will not be enforced so as "to impose support
obligations on the taxpayers" and that the Osborne court's decision concerning
antenuptial contracts was in accord with this rule. 225 Thus, the Appeals Court
established that if the husband, who had remarried and appeared to be
supporting four children, 227 were able to pay support to his former wife, he
would be required to do so in order that she would not become or continue to
be a public charge. 228
In establishing that the husband would now be required to pay support if
he were able, the Appeals Court expressed its dissatisfaction with the provision
of the equitable distribution statute allowing alimony to be sought "at any time
after a divorce." 229 The court observed that it was "most troublesome to im-
pose additional burdens on a husband long after he reasonably believed he was
free of obligation to his former wife. . . "250 But, the court noted, it saw "no
legislative intent to limit the husband's liability." 23 ' The court further noted
that one commentator has criticized this open-ended liability and that some
jurisdictions have a contrary policy. 232
the wife could not live on her income. Id. The wife was living in public housing. Id. at 457, 434
N.E.2d at 216. She had been hospitalized for mental illness several times prior to the couple's
separation and eighteen to twenty times after the divorce. Id. Her income was minimal and she
had no assets. Id. At the time of the hearing she was a full time college student. Id. The probate
judge had found that acquisition of a college degree would enhance the wife's employability, but
that mental illness might at times limit her ability to work. Id.
222
	
at 458, 434 N.E.2d at 217. Brackets and elipsis are the court's.
226 id.
227 Id. There was no evidence concerning the second wife's income. Id. The court noted
that the trial judge had concluded that the husband was supporting his second wife and four
children. Id. In remanding the case the Appeals Court observed that the second wife's income,
assets and obligations should be considered in determining the husband's ability to pay. Id. at
460, 434 N.E.2d at 218.
At the time of divorce, the husband earned $12,000 a year. Id. at 458, 434 N.E.2d at
217. By the time of the later action for alimony, the husband earned over $35,000 a year. Id. But
in addition to supporting his second wife and four children, he was carrying a mortgage of over
$50,000 on his house. Id.
228 Id. at 459, 434 N.E.2d at 217.
229 Id. at 459-60, 434 N.E.2d at 218, (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, 34). The
court observed that under this statute an award of alimony can be made if circumstances have
changed, even though no award of alimony was made at the time of divorce. Id. at 460, 434
N.E.2d at 218.
"° Id. at 459, 434 N.E.2d at 218. The court observed that it was especially troublesome
to do so where the husband "has voluntarily shouldered full responsibility for his children
because of the wife's illness." Id.
232 Id.
232 Id. at 460 n.3, 434 N.E.2d at 218 n.3.
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Talbot demonstrates that open-ended liability can operate in an ineq-
uitable manner. But both Talbot and Osborne make explicit that the reason for
imposing such liability is to prevent an ex-spouse from becoming a burden on
the taxpayer. 2" Yet the Talbot court's criticisms" 4 raise the question of whether
some time limit on this liability is desirable. At present, however, under the
rule adopted in Osborne, there appears to be no time limit. Osborne, in summary,
seems to establish that an antenuptial contract which has been enforced at the
time of divorce may later be modified, at least when modification is necessary
to prevent an ex-spouse from becoming a public charge."' Whether modifica-
tion will be permitted in other circumstances is an issue left unclear by Osborne.
III. PROPOSED STATUTE
In Osborne, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts followed the cur-
rent trend of judicial decisions holding that antenuptial contracts governing
alimony and property rights upon divorce are not per se against public policy
and may be specifically enforced. Recognizing that these contracts may be
valid is an improvement upon the traditional void per se rule since the latter
forecloses any possibility of planning realistically for the financial consequences
of divorce. But Osborne is also an example of a court's establishing guidelines to
determine the enforceability of these antenuptial contracts which will render
their enforcement uncertain. By adopting Rosenberg' s fair disclosure rules, 236
the Osborne court has established that a contract will be valid if, prior to its ex-
ecution, each party has fully disclosed to the other the amount, character and
value of his or her assets."' An itemized list of assets and their values, attached
to the contract, should comply with this fair disclosure requirement. But one
commentator has suggested that those required to list the value of assets may
mistakenly or consciously undervalue assets, thus rendering the contract sub-
ject to attack."' In the absence of disclosure, a fair provision for the party con-
testing the contract, as measured at the date of the contract's execution, will
render the contract valid."' But fairness is a subjective standard and its ambi-
guity invites challenges to the contract's validity. A more significant hindrance
to certainty than the fair disclosure rules is Osborne' s second guideline, under
which the antenuptial contract must be fair and reasonable at the time of the
judgment nisi to be enforceable. 24° This guideline is too discretionary and un-
2" Osborne v. Osborne, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2216, 2224, 428 N.E.2d 810, 816 (1981);
Talbot v. Talbot, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 456, 458, 434 N.E.2d 215, 217 (1982).
234 See supra text accompanying notes 229-32.
235 See supra text accompanying notes 203-17.
236 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2216, 2224, 428 N.E.2d 810, 816 (1981), citing Rosenberg v.
Lipnick, 377 Mass. 666, 389 N.E.2d 385 (1979).




2" See supra notes 166-78 and accompanying text.
24° 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2216, 2224, 428 N.E.2d 810, 816 (1981).
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predictable, simply repeating the flaws inherent in the equitable distribution
process. Osborne's third guideline, which permits later judicial modification of
the contract, if, for example, one spouse is or will become a public charge ;241
also creates uncertainty and possible inequity in that even an initially en-
forceable contract can apparently be set aside long after a marriage has
ended. 242
Admittedly, however, the Osborne court is one of a small number of courts
to recognize that antenuptial contracts governing both alimony and property
rights upon divorce may be specifically enforced. 243
 The court's decision to ap-
ply the rules governing the enforceability of postnuptial separation agreements
to these antenuptial contracts is in accord with the public policies underlying
the laws governing separation agreements, as the court itself acknowledged. 244
But these rules render the enforceability of these antenuptial contracts too un-
certain and should be changed by statute. Our society is too diverse, marriage
perhaps means too many different things to different people, for everyone to be
required to risk all property upon divorce under the equitable distribution
statute. Antenuptial contracts are used most often by those who have been
married at least once before. 245
 Often, the prospective spouses are past middle
age. 246 The
 parties, themselves, before the marriage, may well be the best
judges of the contract's fairness, best able to take into account situations in
which but for the antenuptial contract there would be no marriage. 247
 They,
perhaps, are best able to balance their needs and desires — the prior spousal or
child support obligations of one of the parties, 248
 the desire of one party to keep
property intact for children of a previous marriage, 249 the desire to avoid litiga-
tion, and to protect substantial property,"° or more simply a house acquired
before the marriage,"' from equitable distribution.
The role of the courts in determining both the validity and enforceability
of these antenuptial contracts should be limited to scrutinizing the fairness of
the contract formation process, not the fairness of the contract itself. One com-
mentator has suggested that despite the poetic language used in some judicial
opinions, the real concern of the state is preventing one ex-spouse from becom-
ing a burden upon the welfare roles. 252 Thus, any statute intended to render
241 Id.
242 See supra notes 202-17 and accompanying text.
242 See cases cited supra in note 3.
244
 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2216, 2224, 428 N.E.2d 810, 816 (1981).
245 See supra note 79 for authority.
246 See Gamble, supra note 70, at 723.
2" See cases cited supra in note 82.
248 See, e.g. , Unander v. Unander, 265 Or. 102, 104, 506 P.2d 719, 720 (1973).
249
 See, e.g., Burtoff v. Burtoff, 418 A.2d 1085, 1087 (D.C. App. 1980); In re Marriage of
Headington, 41 Or. App. 503, 505, 599 P.2d 1173 (1979).
250 See, e.g., Burtoff v. Burtoff, 418 A.2d 1085, 1087 (D.C. App. 1980).
221 In re Marriage of Coward, 35 Or. App. 677, 679, 582 P.2d 834, 835 (1978).
252 See Gamble, supra note 70, at 729.
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the enforcement of these antenuptial contracts more certain should take into
account this state interest. Further, since overreaching can occur in the execu-
tion of these antenuptial contracts, a statute should take this into account. But
such a statute should also be based on a recognition that claims of non-
disclosure, duress, overreaching, or undue influence will be frequent if the
validity of the antenuptial contract is litigated. 2"
New York, in 1980, in enacting a statute providing for the equitable
distribution of property upon divorce, enacted, as part of that statute, a provi-
sion which allows intended spouses to contract out of the statutory framework
to some extent.'" The provision of the New York statute governing the prop-
erty provisions of these contracts, if joined to procedures recommended by Pro-
fessor Gamble,'" should be enacted so that prospective spouses can enter a
valid and binding antenuptial contract governing their property rights upon
divorce. New York Domestic Relations Law, chapter 236(B)(3) provides in
pertinent part:
Agreement of the parties. An agreement by the parties, made
before or during the marriage, shall be valid and enforceable in a
matrimonial action if such agreement is in writing, subscribed by
the parties, and acknowledged or proven in the manner required to
entitle a deed to be recorded. Such an agreement may include . . .
(2) provision for the ownership, division, or distribution of separate
and marital property. . . . 256
This provision contains no requirement that the property provisions of an
antenuptial contract be fair and reasonable or not unconscionable either at the
time of the contract's execution or at the time of its enforcement. It does,
however, leave open claims of nondisclosure, duress, and the like. To foreclose
many of these claims, the statute should also include a modified form of the
provisions recommended by Professor Gamble. 2" Thus, the statute should
provide that if both parties to the contract have been represented by independ-
253 See, e.g. , Spector v. Spector, 23 Ariz. App. 131, 140, 531 P.2d 176, 185 (1975) (con-
tract valid); Lutgert v. Lutgert, 338 So. 2d 1111, 1116 (Fla. App. 1976) (contract invalid);
Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 170 Ind. App. 331, 334, 352 N.E.2d 785, 787 (1976) (contract valid);
Matlock v. Matlock, 223 Kan. 679, 682, 576 P.2d 629, 633 (1978) (contract valid); Osborne v.
Osborne, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2216, 2226, 428 N.E.2d 810, 817 (1981) (contract valid); Ferry v.
Ferry, 586 S.W.2d 782, 787 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (contract invalid); Laird v. Laird, 597 P.2d
463, 467 (Wyo. 1979). See also Carnell v. Carnell, 398 So. 2d 503, 506 (Fla. App. 1981) (contract
valid) in which the husband, an attorney who had drafted his own antenuptial contract, later
claimed that he had been overreached by his prospective wife who, he claimed, was " 'cool as a
cucumber' while he was 'swept off his feet.' "
754 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW S 236(B)(3) (Consol. 1981-1982).
755 See Gamble, supra note 70, at 733-35.
5 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW 5 236(B)(3)(2) (Consol. 1981-1982). New York, in contrast to
Massachusetts, does not necessarily subject premarital, gift and inherited property to equitable
distribution. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW 5 236(B)(1), (5) (Consol. 1981-1982) and note 16 supra.
257 See Gamble, supra note 70, at 733-35.
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ent legal counse1256
 or have had the opportunity to consult counsel of their own
choice, 259 and if both have listed their assets in the contract, then actual fraud
committed in the execution of the contract shall be the sole ground for challeng-
ing the validity and enforceability of the property provisions of the antenuptial
contract. 26° In the absence of actual fraud, the property provisions of the
antenuptial contract shall be binding.
In enacting a statute permitting spouses to contract out of the equitable
distribution statute, New York also recognized the interest of prospective
spouses in settling possible alimony claims before the marriage. New York
Domestic Relations Law, chapter 236(B)(3) provides in pertinent part that an
antenuptial contract may include
(3) provision for the amount and duration of maintenance
. . . , subject to the provisions of section 5-311 of the general obli-
gations law, and provided that such terms were fair and reasonable
at the time of the making of the agreement and are not unconscion-
able at the time of entry of final judgment . . . 261
The flaw in this provision of the statute is that it introduces the subjective and
ambiguous concepts of fairness and conscionability. 262 Thus, both the enforce-
ability and modifiability of the contractual provision governing alimony would
be uncertain until the contract were litigated. Professor Gamble has proposed a
statute which would eliminate much of the uncertainty, but at the same time
take into account the state's interest in not assuming the burden of supporting
ex-spouses. 263 That statute provides in substance that the alimony provisions of
antenuptial contracts shall be binding on the spouse waiving rights, provided
that
(a) both parties have been represented by independent legal
counsel in the execution of the contract264 or have had the oppor-
tunity to consult counsel of their own choice's' and,
(b) both parties have disclosed their assets in the contract and,
258 Gamble, supra note 70, at 733.
"8 Gamble's proposal does not include this provision. One current statute does,
however, include such a provision. MINN. STAT. ANN. S 519.11(1) (West 1982).
To further protect the party disadvantaged by the contract, the statute might also pro-
vide that its provisions will apply only if the contract has been executed in the presence of two wit-
nesses, acknowledged by the parties before a notary, and executed prior to the day of the mar-
riage. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. 5 519.11(2) (West 1982).
26° Gamble, supra note 70, at 733-35.
2" N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW 5 236(B)(3) (3). (Consol. 1981-1982).
2" The proposed UMPA of 1981 shares this flaw. Although,the UMPA allows prospec-
tive spouses to enter antenuptial contracts concerning property rights, to be enforceable the con:
tract must be not unconscionable at the time of property division. UMPA, supra note 3, at S
16(a).
263 See Gamble, supra note 70, at 733-36.
264 Gamble, supra note 70, at 733-36.
265 Gamble's proposal does not include this provision. See supra note 259.
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(c) there has been no actual fraud in the execution of the con-
tract. 266
The statute proposed by Professor Gamble further provides in substance that
(d) if one spouse is a public charge, then fhe Department of
Welfare may seek reimbursement of payments from the other ex-
spouse. 267
The desirability of section (d) of this statute is questionable. In essence, it
would impose the same open-ended liability on an ex-spouse that the present
rules governing antenuptial contracts do. 26° Thus, the same objections to this
kind of liability apply. When marriage itself is often no longer lifelong, a poten-
tially lifelong spousal support obligation may no longer accord with the societal
concept of what marriage entails. Thus, the statute should impose a time limit
on the spousal support liability of an ex-spouse. 269
 The statute should, there-
fore, further provide that
The Department of Welfare may not seek reimbursement of
payments from an ex-spouse in any case in which such payments
have been made more than one year after a judgment of divorce
has been entered.
Finally, the statute should provide that
If the parties to an antenuptial contract do not follow the pro-
cedures set forth in this statute, then in any action in which the
validity and enforceability of the contract is at issue, only ordinary
contract defenses shall be available. 270
CONCLUSION
In holding that antenuptial contracts governing alimony or property rights
upon divorce may be specifically enforced, the Osborne court has joined a
minority of courts. The decisions of these courts implicitly or explicitly
recognize that in a society in which both divorce and remarriage are common,
prospective spouses have a significant interest in planning for the financial con-
sequences of divorce. But the rules which govern the enforceability of these
antenuptial contracts renders their enforcement uncertain. The rules estab-
lished by the Osborne court do express, however, the public policies underlying
the laws governing awards of alimony and division of property upon divorce.
266 See Gamble, supra note 70, at 733-36.
267 See Gamble, supra note 70, at 736.
768 See supra notes 202-35 and accompanying text,
"9
 For additional reasons to impose a time limit, see supra notes 218-32 and accompany-
ing text. A further reason for establishing a time limit on spousal support claims is that the state's
interest in requiring one ex-spouse to support another so that he or she does not become a public
charge may not in all instances be compelling. See Klarman, supra note 10, at 407, raising, but not
answering this question.
275 See, e.g., Buettner v. Buettner, 89 Nev. 39, 45, 505 P.2d 600, 604 (1973).
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But these laws — if they meet anyone's needs or desires — are not sufficiently
responsive to the needs or desires of people entering a second, third, or fourth
marriage, or of people entering a first marriage with substantial property.
These laws should be corrected for their overinclusiveness by enactment of a
statute permitting prospective spouses to enter a binding and enforceable ante-
nuptial contract governing alimony and property rights.
PAMELA M. DONNA
